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PATENT LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR




This article attempts to provide a comprehensive review of the
patent law decisions published by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit in 1990. It is intended to serve as a
practical tool for the practitioner seeking to learn what issues of
patent law were considered and decided by the Federal Circuit in
the past year. The article provides a concise review of the facts and
legal issues presented in each patent opinion published by the Fed-
eral Circuit in 1990, together with a summary of the appellate
court's determination of those issues.
Six of the patent decisions published by the Federal Circuit in
1990 appear to be of particular significance:
In Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. International Trade Commission1 the
Federal Circuit considered the extent of protection afforded under
19 USC § 1337(a) against the importation of allegedly infringing
goods. The Federal Circuit determined that 19 USC § 1337(a) pro-
hibits imports which are made by using a process protected by a
U.S. patent, but does not prohibit imports which are made by a
process that merely uses an article protected by a U.S. patent.
In Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates2
the Federal Circuit clarified that, in contrast to some of the Court's
previous statements, the doctrine of equivalents does not "expand"
the scope of a patent claim. However, the range of permissible
equivalents of a patent claim under the doctrine may nevertheless
be limited by the prior art. As proposed by the Federal Circuit in
Wilson Sporting Goods, the test for determining whether the prior
Copyright © 1992 by Alex Chartove and Joseph T. Fitzgerald.
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art restricts the range of permissible equivalents requires considera-
tion of the patentability of a hypothetical claim that is sufficient in
scope to literally cover the allegedly infringing product.
In In re Bond' the Federal Circuit considered the requirements
for a proper rejection, under 35 USC § 102, of a claim containing
means-plus-function terminology. As expressed by the Federal Cir-
cuit, a proper rejection under § 102 requires consideration of
whether the function performed by the prior art device is caused by
a structure within the prior art device and, if so, whether the struc-
ture is equivalent to that disclosed in the application as being exem-
plary of the claimed means for performing the function.
The requirements of a proper "best mode" analysis under 35
USC § 112 were discussed by the Federal Circuit in Chemcast Corp.
v. Arco Industries Corp.4 The Federal Circuit concluded that a
proper best mode analysis requires a comparison between what the
inventor knew at the time the patent application was filed and what
the inventor disclosed in the patent application to determine
whether the disclosure is adequate to enable a skilled artisan to
practice the inventor's contemplated best mode. The best mode re-
quirement of § 112 may therefore be violated where an inventor
fails to disclose non-claimed elements, if those non-claimed ele-
ments are necessary to practice the best mode of carrying out the
claimed invention.
In VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. I the Federal
Circuit concluded that the 1988 amendment of 28 USC § 1391(c)
changed the meaning of the term "resides" in 28 USC § 1400(b),
and thus changed the long-standing interpretation of the patent
venue statute. Consequently, with respect to a defendant that is a
corporation, the first test for venue under 28 USC § 1400(b) is
whether the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in the
district of suit at the time the action was commenced.
In In re Dillon6 the Federal Circuit considered the require-
ments necessary to establish, under 35 USC § 103, a prima facie
showing of obviousness of a chemical composition. The Federal
Circuit concluded that a prima facie showing of obviousness is es-
tablished by a demonstration that the claimed chemical composi-
tion is similar to chemical compositions disclosed in the prior art,
and that the reason or motivation for developing the claimed chemi-
3. 910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
4. 913 F.2d 923 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
5. 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
6. 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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cal composition can be found in the prior art. A suggestion of the
properties of the claimed chemical composition in the prior art is
not necessary to establish a prima facie showing.
I. NOVELTY - 35 USC § 102
A. The Existence of the "On Sale" Bar Depends Upon the
Totality of the Circumstances
To determine whether an offer to sell an invention under 35
USC § 102(b) has in fact been made, the "totality of the circum-
stances" must always be considered.7 The "totality of the circum-
stances" approach is necessary because the "on sale" bar of
§ 102(b) is, in effect, defined by the policies or purposes underlying
the bar.' These policies include: discouraging removal of inventions
from the public domain that the public has reasonably come to be-
lieve are freely available; favoring the prompt and widespread dis-
closure of inventions; allowing the inventor a reasonable amount of
time following sales activity to determine the potential economic
value of a patent; and prohibiting the inventor from commercially
exploiting his invention beyond the statutorily prescribed time.9
Whether the policies underlying the on-sale bar supported its
application was the principal issue presented in Envirotech Corp. v.
Westech Engineering, Inc. 10 The subject patent in Envirotech was
directed to a ballasted digester cover for use in wastewater treat-
ment plants. The patent application had been filed on May 29,
1981. The "critical date" under 35 USC § 102(b) was therefore
May 29, 1980.
The invention had been conceived sometime between February
and May, 1980. Prior to May 8, 1980, the patent owner had sub-
mitted a proposal for a ballasted digester cover to a group of general
contractors. The evidence indicated that the patent owner's strat-
egy was to offer a prior art design in the proposal and then later
attempt to substitute the patented invention in the actual project.
Thus, although the patent owner intended to ultimately exploit the
invention on the project, the proposal offered a ballasted digester
cover in accordance with a prior art design. On May 8, 1980, the
patent owner's proposal was accepted.
7. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860, (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
8. RCA Corp. v. Data General Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1062, (Fed. Cir. 1989).
9. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d at 860; See also Manville Sales
Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
10. 904 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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The district court granted the accused infringer's motion for
partial summary judgment, holding that the patent owner's May 8
proposal to sell a ballasted digester cover placed the invention "on
sale" within the meaning of 35 USC § 102(b). 11 The patent owner
appealed the judgment of the district court. 2
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that 35 USC § 102(b) re-
quires the inventor's attempt to exploit the invention to be objec-
tively manifested as a definite sale or offer to sell the invention. The
subjective, uncommunicated, and ultimate intention of the inventor,
however clear, is not alone sufficient to trigger the on-sale bar. Ap-
plying this standard to the evidence of record, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the patent owner neither definitely offered for sale,
nor otherwise exploited the invention, until after the critical date of
May 29, 1980.
The Federal Circuit distinguished Envirotech from RCA Corp.
v. Data General Corp. 13 with respect to two significant facts. First,
in Envirotech, the bid document clearly specified a prior art design
rather than the patented invention, while in RCA, the bid docu-
ment contained a technical description sufficient to identify the pat-
ented invention.14 Second, the patent owner in Envirotech intended
to keep the patented design confidential until after the critical
date."5 In RCA, the offeror intended to offer the invention prior to
the critical date.' 6 It was these factors which led the court to the
two different results regarding the on-sale bar.
In Envirotech, the Federal Circuit found that while the evi-
dence showed that the patent owner intended to ultimately exploit
the invention on the project, the evidence did not support the con-
clusion that the patent owner had offered the invention for sale
prior to the critical date. The relevant public (the general contrac-
tors that received the patent owner's proposal) could not have come
to believe that the invention was freely available based upon the
May 8 proposal. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court
was reversed and the case remanded.
The issue of whether the totality of the circumstances estab-
lished the existence of an "on sale" bar was also present in U.S.
11. Envirotech Corp v. Westech Engineering, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 372, 377 (D. Utah
1989).
12. Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Engineering, Inc. 904 F.2d at 1571.
13. 887 F.2d 1056.
14. Environtech Corp. v. Westech Engineering, Inc., 904 F.2d at 575-76.
15. 904 F.2d at 1576.
16. 887 F.2d at 1060.
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Environmental Products, Inc. v. Westall.1  In this case, the patent
owner had sold a version of the patented sludge dewatering system
to the City of Sunrise, Florida. The purchase agreement had been
signed on September 29, 1976. The patent had been filed on August
2, 1978. Thus, the "critical date" under 35 USC § 102(b) was Au-
gust 2, 1977.
After a jury trial, the district court held the patent invalid be-
cause the invention had been on sale more than one year prior to
the patent application filing date. The district court concluded that
the patent owner had failed to meet its burden of coming forward
with sufficient evidence to counter the prima facie showing of an on-
sale bar.
On appeal, the patent owner argued that the district court had
improperly imposed upon it the burden of proving experimental
use.1" The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that once aprimafacie
case of an on-sale bar is demonstrated, the burden is on the patent
holder to "come forward with convincing evidence to counter that
showing." 19
The Federal Circuit further noted that the district court had
appropriately considered a number of factors in considering
whether the "totality of the circumstances" established the exist-
ence of an on-sale bar.20 For example, the final offer-to-sell letter
provided that the dewatering units would be completely under the
control of the purchaser. The Federal Circuit found that the patent
owner's lack of supervision over the operation of the invention,
while not controlling, was strong evidence of a commercial
purpose.21
Despite evidence of some tests, the lack of written progress
records provided additional circumstantial evidence of a non-exper-
imental purpose.2 2 Evidence of lack of secrecy obligations on the
part of the user,23 and the existence of promotional activities,24 were
17. 911 F.2d 713 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
18. A § 102(b) bar is avoided if the primary purpose of the sale is experimental. Baker
Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1987); UMC Elecs. Co. v.
United States, 816 F.2d 647, 657 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).
19. TP Laboratories, Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971 (Fed. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
20. See, e.g., Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 815 F.2d 1478, 1480-81 & n.2
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
21. See In re Hamilton, 882 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1989); See also In re Smith, 714 F.2d
1127, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
22. See TP Laboratories v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d at 969.
23. Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
24. Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 815 F.2d at 1481.
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also viewed by the Federal Circuit as inconsistent with the patent
owner's claim of experimental use.
Evidence that the patent owner did not make a profit on the
installation, but was only reimbursed for part of its actual costs, was
unpersuasive. A patent owner may create an on-sale bar despite
losing money on a sale.25 Similarly, evidence that the purchaser
was advised and understood that the system was "experimental"
was not dispositive. The subjective belief of inventors or customers
that the system was "experimental" must be weighed against objec-
tive evidence which indicates otherwise.26
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that, under certain circum-
stances, an inventor may need to have a customer test the invention
to determine that it works as intended. However, the question is
whether the facts lead to the conclusion that the subject sale was for
such a purpose.27 In US. Environmental Products, Inc. the totality
of the circumstances indicated that the sale.was for a commercial,
not an experimental, purpose. The Federal Circuit, by affirming the
district court's ruling, found that the patent was invalid by virtue of
the on-sale bar.
B. The Requirements of a "Printed Publication"
To serve as a "printed publication" under 35 USC § 102(b), a
document must be generally available.2" Whether four allegedly an-
ticipatory documents were sufficiently available to constitute
"printed publication" under 35 USC § 102(b) was an issue raised in
Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp.29
The documents in question were four reports on aspects of the
"AESOP-B" system (a complex military system for on-line distrib-
uted computer processing of logistical data). The documents were
housed in a library at the company having principal responsibility
for developing the AESOP-B system. Access to the library was re-
stricted to persons authorized by the company. The reports were
not under security classification, and were distributed to approxi-
25. Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 840
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
26. In re Brigance, 792 F.2d 1103, 1108 & n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Harrington Mfg. Co. v.
Powell Mfg. Co., 815 F.2d at 1481 & n.3.
27. See City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877).
28. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Massachusetts Institute of Technol.
ogy v. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226-27
(C.C.P.A. 1981).
29. 908 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 296 (1990).
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mately fifty persons or organizations involved in the AESOP-B
project.
While only one of the documents contained the notice "Repro-
duction or further dissemination is not authorized... not for public
release." 30
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that
all of the documents "were of the class of documents that would
have been distributed with such a notice" and "may have" con-
tained such a notice.3' In addition, the Federal Circuit was unable
to find that anyone could have had access to the documents by exer-
cising reasonable diligence. The Federal Circuit affirmed that these
documents were not printed publications under 35 USC § 102(b).
C. 35 USC § 102(g) is Applicable in Infringement Litigation
In the case of New Idea Farm Equipment Corp. v. Sperry
Corp.,32 the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the notion that 35 USC
§ 102(g) 33 is applicable in situations other than interferences.
In New Idea Farm Equipment the suit resulted from patent ap-
plications filed in 1973. In 1971 an application for a similar inven-
tion had been filed by a different inventive entity, resulting in the
issuance of U.S. Patent No. 3,832,837 (the '837 patent).
The accused infringer's defense was based on patent invalidity,
arguing that the prior invention by the inventor named in the '837
patent invalidated the patents in suit under 35 USC §§ 102(a) and
(g). After a jury determination that the inventor named in the '837
patent was the first to both conceive and reduce the invention to
practice, the district court held that the patents in suit were invalid
based on 35 USC §§ 102(a) and 102(g).
The Federal Circuit agreed, stating that while 35 USC § 102(g)
is more commonly applied to interferences, it is also applicable to
prior invention situations other than in the context of an interfer-
ence.34 The Federal Circuit concluded that the dates of conception
and reduction to practice shown by the inventor named in the '837
patent were relevant in determining whether his inventive activity
was prior to, and therefore invalidated, by the patents in suit under
30. Id. at 1325.
31. Id.
32. 916 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 102 provides, in pertinent part, that a "person shall be entitled to a
patent unless-... (g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this
country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it."
34. See E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430 (Fed.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986 (1988).
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§ 102(g). The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment of
invalidity under 35 USC § 102(g).
D. Novelty of a Claim Containing "Means-Plus-Function"
Terminology
The case of In re Bond 31 involved an appeal from a decision of
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirming a final re-
jection under 35 USC § 102 based upon a single patent reference.
The claims defined a combination of elements, including a "de-
lay means" recited in "means-plus-function" terminology. In re-
jecting the claim, the Board found that the cited reference also
disclosed a delay means. However, the Board made no finding that
the delay means disclosed in the reference and the delay means de-
fined in the application claims were structurally equivalent.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that a "means-plus-func-
tion" limitation is required by statute to be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specifica-
tion and equivalents thereof.36
The Board was therefore required to consider whether the de-
lay experienced by the device disclosed in the reference is caused by
any "structure" within the reference device. If so, the Board must
also consider whether this "structure" is equivalent to that dis-
closed in the application as being exemplary of the claimed delay
means. The invention claimed in the application is anticipated by
the reference only if each of these inquiries is answered in the af-
firmative. Because the Board did not make these inquiries, its deci-
sion as to anticipation was deficient. The Federal Circuit therefore
vacated the decision and remanded the case.
E. Overcoming a Reference Based on the Invention's New
Properties
The subject invention in In re Spada 37 was a pressure sensitive
adhesive composition. The application claims, which consisted en-
tirely of composition claims, were rejected by the Board as unpat-
entable under 35 USC §§ 102 and 103 in view of a single reference.
The reference and the application both disclosed polymers of the
same monomers. However, the reference and the application de-
scribed the products obtained as being quite different.
35. 910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
36. See In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
37. 911 F.2d 705 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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The applicant's position on appeal to the Federal Circuit was
that the claimed polymers were not anticipated by the polymers of
the reference because the properties of the claimed polymers and
the prior art polymers were different.
The Federal Circuit noted, however, that the initial inquiry is
to the novelty of the claimed composition, rather than its proper-
ties. The discovery of a new or nonobvious property or use of a
previously known composition cannot impart patentability to
claims directed to a known composition, even when that property
and use are unobvious from the prior art.
38
The Federal Circuit found in Spada that the virtual identity of
monomers and procedures sufficed to support aprimafacie case of
unpatentability for lack of novelty.39 The burden of showing that
the claimed polymer compositions were different from those de-
scribed in the reference was therefore reasonably placed upon the
applicant.' The Federal Circuit found that this burden is not met
simply reciting the assertedly different properties in the claims. The
court explained that when a claimed composition is not novel, it is
not rendered novel merely by recitation of properties, regardless of
whether such properties are shown or suggested in the prior art.
The decision of the Board rejecting the claims of the patent applica-
tion was therefore affirmed.
II. OBvIousNEss - 35 USC § 103
A. Prima Facie Obviousness Does Not Require a Prior Art
Suggestion of the Properties of the Invention
The burden imposed on examiners in establishing a prima facie
showing of obviousness was addressed by the Federal Circuit in the
case of In re Dillon."1 The subject invention in Dillon was a hydro-
carbon fuel containing an amount of tetra-orthoester sufficient to
reduce the particulate emissions from the combustion of the fuel.
The applicant had discovered that the inclusion of tetra-orthoesters
in hydrocarbon fuel reduced the emission of solid particulates (i.e.,
soot) during fuel combustion.
Tetra-orthoesters are a known class of chemical compound.
They are structurally similar to tri-orthoesters. The examiner had
38. Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 780, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re
Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Lemin, 326 F.2d 437, 440 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
39. See, eg., In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697-98 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
40. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664
(C.C.P.A. 1971).
41. 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1682 (1991).
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uncovered prior art describing the use of tri-orthoesters as a hydro-
carbon fuel additive. However, the examiner had not uncovered
any prior art describing the use of tetra-orthoesters as a hydrocar-
bon fuel additive. Nor had the examiner found any prior art show-
ing or suggesting the use of tetra-orthoesters as an additive to
reduce particulate emissions from combustion of hydrocarbon fuel.
The examiner nevertheless decided that the prior art established a
prima facie showing of obviousness.
In response, the applicant argued that the lack of any prior art
describing or suggesting the properties of and results achieved by
the invention (i.e., the reduction of soot from combustion of hydro-
carbon fuel) was sufficient to demonstrate that a prima facie show-
ing had not been established.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the examiner, concluding that
a suggestion of the properties of the invention in the prior art is not
necessary to establish a prima facie showing. All that is necessary is
a demonstration that the claimed invention is similar to inventions
disclosed in the prior art, and that the reason or motivation for de-
veloping the claimed invention can be found in the prior art. Once
these two requirements are met, according to the Federal Circuit,
the prima facie showing of obviousness is established.42
The Federal Circuit stated that the properties of an invention
are still relevant to establishing a prima facie showing, but only to
the extent that the invention's properties may affect the second of
these two requirements (i.e., the reason or motivation for develop-
ing the invention).43 That is, if the prior art fails to disclose useful
properties for inventions that are related to the claimed invention,
then this may indicate that the motivation for developing the
claimed invention can not be found in the prior art, thereby pre-
cluding a prima facie showing. However, a prima facie showing is
not precluded merely because the prior art fails to describe or sug-
gest the properties of and results achieved by the claimed invention.
The Federal Circuit noted that its decision in Dillon does not
preclude a patent applicant from overcoming the prima facie show-
ing in a number of different ways. For example, the applicant may
still present comparison test data showing that the invention pro-
duces unexpectedly improved results when compared with the prior
art. The applicant may also challenge the prima facie showing on
grounds that the showing is insufficiently supported, incorrect, or
based on illogical reasoning.
42. Id. at 1901.
43. Id. at 1905.
[Vol. 8
PATENTLAWDEVELOPMENTS
B. Findings on Obviousness Must be Predicated On Factual
Determinations
To establish invalidity under 35 USC § 103, certain factual
predicates are required before the legal conclusion of obviousness or
nonobviousness can be reached. The underlying factual determina-
tions to be considered are (1) the scope and content of the prior art,
(2) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art,
(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art, and (4) objective evidence of
non-obviousness, such as commercial success, long-felt but un-
solved need, failure of others, copying, and unexpected results.'
The issue of whether these underlying factual determinations
had been adequately established was presented in the case of Green-
wood v. Hattori Seiko Co.45 In Greenwood the accused infringer
filed a request for reexamination of the subject patent in response to
the patent owner's suit for infringement.
During the reexamination proceeding, the examiner initially
rejected all claims of the subject patent under 35 USC § 103. The
patent owner responded by traversing the merits of the rejection
and by filing an affidavit under 35 CFR § 1.131 demonstrating con-
ception of the invention prior to the date of the cited references.
The examiner consequently issued a Reexamination Certificate.
Following the conclusion of the reexamination proceeding, the
district court, on motion for summary judgment by the accused in-
fringer, held that the patent owner's affidavit under 35 CFR § 1.131
was insufficient to antedate the cited references because the affidavit
was "silent" as to the required showing of diligence between the
asserted date of conception and reduction of practice. After finding
the affidavit insufficient, the district court reinstated the examiner's
initial rejection for obviousness and held the patent invalid under 35
USC § 103 based on the initial action of the examiner.46
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the district court's
Memorandum and Order was, in essence, an inappropriate review
of the PTO's reexamination proceeding. The Federal Circuit deter-
mined that the district court had improperly treated the reexamina-
tion as if it were part of the patent owner's suit against the accused
infringer.
The Federal Circuit stated that in an infringement suit before a
44. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 117 (1966); Perkin-Elmer Corp., 732 F.2d
888, 894 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984).
45. 900 F.2d 238 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
46. Greenwood v. Seiko Instruments and Electronics, Ltd., 711 F. Supp. 30 (D.D.C.
1989).
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district court, the invalidity of a patent under 35 USC § 103 must
be decided on the basis of prior art presented in the proceeding
before the court. The issue cannot be decided merely by accepting
or rejecting the adequacy of the positions taken by the patentee in
order to obtain a Certificate of Reexamination.
The district court must analyze the prior art references relied
on by the accused infringer in the manner required by Graham to
determine whether the references would have rendered the inven-
tion obvious under § 103. Since the district court in Greenwood
failed to make the requisite factual findings or stipulations, the Fed-
eral Circuit found no basis for reviewing the district court's legal
determination of obviousness. The Federal Circuit therefore va-
cated the district court's summary judgment of obviousness under
35 USC § 103.
C. Weight Given to Unpredictability of Biological Properties
The subject patent in In re Eli Lilly & Co.4 7 was directed to a
method of using the chemical compound X537A to enhance feed
conversion efficiency in mature ruminant animals, such as cattle
and sheep.
The references cited during a reexamination of the patent dis-
closed the control of coccidiosis in fowl by treatment with X537A,
and the weight gain effect of this treatment. The cited references
also disclosed an "animal feed composition" containing X537A "for
aiding in improving the efficiency of conversion of feed to weight
gains." The cited references stated that animals raised commer-
cially for food purposes and subject to coccidiosis include "poultry
sheep, cattle, swine, etc."
The examiner found that the cited references established a
prima facie case of obviousness, since the references showed the
same compound, X537A, as having the same general property of
enhancing weight gain in animals as in the claimed invention. The
patentee asserted that the patentability of the claims was established
by the difference between weight gains of steers and calves. The
Board held that the patentee's evidence of improved feed efficiency
in steers as compared with calves did not outweigh the disclosure of
the cited references, and therefore held the reexamination claims
unpatentable under 35 USC § 103.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the patentee had not
claimed a narrow improvement limited to details not shown in the
47. 902 F.2d 943 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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prior art, had not shown unexpected superiority over the properties
taught in the prior art, and had not shown that the claimed use
achieved unexpected results compared with the prior art disclosure
of the same use with the same animals. The cited references stated
that X537A had the specific property of aiding weight gain in ani-
mals, especially in cattle and sheep. Although the unpredictability
of biological properties is recognized and given weight when deter-
mining obviousness, in In re Eli Lily & Co., the Federal Circuit
found that the prior art taught the claimed use with specificity.
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the evidence of
unobviousness did not outweigh the clear prior art teaching of the
property and use of "increasing the efficiency of feed utilization in
ruminant animals."4 Consequently, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the decision of the Board rejecting all of the claims under 35 USC
§ 103.
D. Obviousness of a Method of Making Distinguished From
Obviousness of a Method of Using
Whether an applicant who is entitled to claims drawn to a
novel compound should also be entitled to claims drawn to a
method of using the novel compound was the issue presented in In
re Pleuddemann.4 9
The patent applicant in Pleuddemann had sought allowance of
claims directed to a method of using a novel compound for bonding
or priming. The PTO had previously allowed claims directed to the
novel compound itself, but had rejected all claims directed to the
method of using the novel compound. The rejection was predicated
solely on 35 USC § 103 on the ground of obviousness in view of the
inventor's own U.S. Patent No. 3,258,477.50
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that when a new and use-
ful compound is invented having a particular use, it is possible that
the invention may be viewed legally as having at least three different
aspects, permitting it to be claimed in three different ways. The
invention may be claimed, for example, as: (1) the novel compound
itself; (2) the method of making the novel compound; and (3) the
method of using the novel compound for its intended purpose.51
48. In re Eli Lily & Co., 902 F.2d at 948 (quoting from claim 1).
49. 910 F.2d 823 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
50. The subject application in Pleuddemann incorporated by reference the disclosure of
the inventor's '477 patent.
51. In re Pleuddemann, supra note 49, at 825, (citing In re Kuehl, 475 F.2d 658
(C.C.P.A. 1973)).
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There may be, however, a significant distinction between
claims directed to a method of making a novel compound and
claims directed to a method of using the novel compound. Claims
directed to a method of making a novel compound can be obvious,
even though the compound itself is not. Therefore, cases dealing
with claims directed to a method of making a novel compound may
involve different problems than cases dealing with claims directed
to a method of using the novel compound.
The Federal Circuit further noted that the case of In re Dur-
den,52 on which the Board relied, involved claims directed to a
method of making a novel compound, not a method of using a novel
compound. The single claim on appeal in Durden was held to be
directed to obvious subject matter in view of prior art disclosing a
similar method, notwithstanding the fact that unobvious starting
materials were used and unobvious products were obtained.
In Pleuddemann, in contrast to Durden, the claims were not
directed to a method of making a novel compound, but instead were
directed to a method of using a novel compound. Consequently, the
Federal Circuit did not find Durden to be controlling precedent, as
had the Board. 3 The Federal Circuit therefore held that the appli-
cant was entitled to the method of use claims, together with the
already allowed article of manufacture claims.
E. Claiming a New Benefit of an Old Process Does Not
Render the Process Nonobvious
The issue presented in the case of In re Woodruff54 was
whether the Board had properly rejected the applicant's claims as
obvious under 35 USC § 103 in light of a prior art reference.
The applicant claimed a method for inhibiting the growth of
fungi on fresh fruits and vegetables by storing the vegetables in a
specified modified atmosphere. The modified atmosphere included
various ranges of gas concentrations and temperatures. The prior
art reference disclosed all of the claimed ranges of gas concentra-
tions and temperatures except for one claimed gas concentration
(which overlapped with or was contiguous with that disclosed in the
prior art).
The Federal Circuit found the slight differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art with respect to gas concentra-
tion ranges were not sufficient to render the claimed process patent-
52. 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
53. In re Pleuddenann, supra note 49, at 826.
54. 919 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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able. In view of these slight differences, the applicant was
reasonably required to show that the particular claimed range was
critical, such as by showing that the claimed range achieved unex-
pected results relative to the prior art range."5 The Federal Circuit
found that the applicant had failed to make such a showing.
Nor was patentability established by the newly disclosed bene-
fit of inhibiting the growth of fungi. The Federal Circuit noted that
merely discovering and claiming a new benefit of an old process
does not render the old process patentable.5 6  Even where the
processes encompassed by the claims is not entirely old, the rule is
still applicable to the extent that the claims and the prior art
overlap.
The Federal Circuit therefore held that the Board correctly af-
firmed the rejection under 35 USC § 103.
F. Obviousness is Determined by Viewing the Claimed
Invention as a Whole
The issue in Gillette Company v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.17
was whether the district court had applied the proper test in deter-
mining that the patent at issue was not rendered obvious by the
prior art5.
The patented composition included a "water-soluble gelling
agent." While the individual components of the patented invention
were well known at the time the invention was made, the district
court found that the prior art made no suggestion of substituting
the claimed water-soluble gelling agent for the prior art gelling
agent. The Federal Circuit noted that obviousness is properly de-
termined by viewing the claimed invention as a whole.59 The ac-
cused infringer's focus on the obviousness of substitutions and
differences, instead of on the invention as a whole, was therefore a
55. See, eg., cites in id. at 1578; see also, e.g., Gardner v. TEC Sys., Inc., 725 F.2d 1338,
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 830 (1984); In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In
re Ornitz, 351 F.2d 1013 (C.C.P.A. 1965); In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
56. In re Woodruff, supra note 54, at 1578 (citing Verdegaal Bros. Inc. v. Union Oil
Co., 814 F.2d 628, 632-33 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827 (1987) and Bird Provi-
sion Co. v. Owens Country Sausaqe, Inc., 568 F.2d 369, 375 (5th Cir. 1978)).
57. 919 F.2d 720 (Fed. Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Gillette].
58. The Federal Circuit had previously upheld the validity of the patent at issue in S.C.
Johnson & Son. Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 781 F.2d 198 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The primary
reference before the trial court there was the same as in the present suit.
59. Gillette, supra note 57, at 724 (citing Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,
745 F.2d 1437, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
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legally improper way of determining obviousness.'
The Federal Circuit also found that it was proper for the dis-
trict court to consider the commercial success of the patented in-
vention, noting that a determination of the obviousness of a
combination must include consideration of the results achieved by
that combination.61 The Federal Circuit held that the objective evi-
dence of the patent owner's commercial success supported the non-
obviousness of the patented claims.
Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded the district court properly
applied the law of 35 USC § 103 in finding the patented invention
was not obvious in light of the prior art.
G. Functional Similarities to the Prior Art do Not Render a
Claimed Device Obvious
The case of In re Mills62 involved an appeal from the decision
of the Board affirming a rejection of claims under 35 USC § 103.
All of the rejected claims were apparatus claims.
The Board found that the difference between the claimed de-
vice and the cited reference resided solely in functional language.
The Board, relying on In re Ludtke,6 3 concluded that the applicant
had failed to meet the burden of showing that the device disclosed
in the cited reference lacked the functional characteristics of the
claimed device.
The Federal Circuit noted, however, that Ludtke dealt with a
rejection for lack of novelty under 35 USC § 102. Under § 102,
proof that a prior art device lacks the functional characteristics of
the claimed device would tend to negate the assertion that the
claimed device is anticipated by the prior art device. Consequently,
it is proper to require an applicant to show that the device disclosed
in the cited reference lacks the functional characteristics of the
claimed device.
In contrast to Ludtke, however, Mills involved a rejection for
obviousness under 35 USC § 103. Under § 103, it is not pertinent
whether the prior art device possesses the functional characteristics
of the claimed device, so long as the reference does not describe or
suggest the structure of the claimed device. Consequently, it is not
60. Gillette, supra note 57, at 724 (citing Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies,
Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987)).
61. Gillette, supra note 57, at 725 (citing Interconnect Planninq Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d
1132, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1985) and Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)).
62. 916 F.2d 680 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
63. 441 F.2d 660 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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proper to require an applicant to show that the device disclosed in
the cited reference lacks the functional characteristics of the
claimed device.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the cited reference in fact
did not describe or suggest the structure of the claimed device.
Consequently, the court reversed, holding that the Board had erred
in affirming the rejection of the claims as obvious.
III. SPECIFICATION - 35 USC § 112
A. Best Mode Requirement May Require Disclosure of Non-
claimed Elements
The subject patent in Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Industries Corp."
claimed a sealing member in the form of a grommet or plug button
designed to seal an opening in, for example, a sheet metal panel.
The district court invalidated the patent because of the inven-
tor's failure to disclose the best mode as required by 35 USC
§ 112.65 According to the district court, the principal shortcomings
of the disclosure were its failure to specify (1) the particular type,
(2) the hardness, and (3) the supplier and trade name of the mate-
rial used to make the locking portion of the grommet.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted initially that a proper best
mode analysis has two components. The first is whether, at the
time the patent application was filed, the inventor knew of a mode
of practicing the claimed invention that the inventor considered to
be better than any other. This part of the inquiry is wholly subjec-
tive. If the inventor in fact contemplated such a best mode, then the
second part of the analysis compares what the inventor knew with
what the inventor disclosed to determine whether the disclosure is
adequate to enable a skilled artisan to practice the inventor's con-
templated best mode. Assessing the adequacy of the disclosure is
largely an objective inquiry that depends upon the scope of the
claimed invention and the level of skill in the art.
The patent owner in Chemcast argued that, because the patent
did not claim any specific material for making the locking portion
of the grommet, the failure to disclose the particular material that
the inventor thought worked best did not violate the best mode re-
quirement. The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that the best
mode requirement may be violated where an inventor fails to dis-
64. 913 F.2d 923 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
65. See Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp. 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2005 (E.D. Mich.
1989).
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close non-claimed elements, if those non-claimed elements are nev-
ertheless necessary to practice the best mode of carrying out the
claimed invention.66
Under the best mode requirement of § 112, the question is not
whether a skilled artisan could practice the claimed invention with-
out knowledge of the best mode material. Instead, the question is
whether a skilled artisan could practice the best mode of the inven-
tion as contemplated by the inventor. In Chemcast the record
showed that the inventor had selected a best mode material for the
invention, knew the preferred hardness of this best mode material,
and purchased all of the best mode material under a specific trade
name from a single manufacturer. The Federal Circuit found that
because the patent owner used only the best mode material, because
certain characteristics of the best mode material were claimed ele-
ments of the invention, and because the inventor himself did not
know the formula, composition, or method of manufacture of the
best mode material, § 112 obligated the inventor to disclose the spe-
cific supplier and trade name of the best mode material in the patent
specification.
The record further indicated that the supplier of the best mode
material considered the formulation of the material to be a trade
secret. The Federal Circuit found this fact to have no bearing on
the state of the inventor's knowledge or the adequacy of the patent
disclosure. Regardless of the scope of a manufacturer's asserted
trade secret, to the extent that the trade secret includes information
known by the inventor that the inventor considers part of the best
mode, § 112 requires the inventor to divulge the information.67
The Federal Circuit concluded that, given the specification and
the level of skill in the art, a skilled practitioner could neither have
known what the inventor's contemplated best mode was nor have
carried it out. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was
affirmed.
66. See, eg., Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. Partnership, 860 F.2d 415, 419 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989); Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524,
1536 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987).




IV. BENEFIT OF EARLIER U.S. FILING DATE - 35 USC § 120
A. Distinction Between the Requirements of a Claim-
Supporting Disclosure and a Claim-Anticipating
Disclosure
An issue raised in Chester v. Miller6" concerned the patentabil-
ity of claims in U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 514,122 ("the
'122 application"). The claims in the '122 application had been re-
jected as unpatentable under 35 USC § 102(b) based upon U.S. Pat-
ent No. 4,309,280 ("the '280 patent"). The '122 application had
been filed as a continuation-in-part of the application that ulti-
mately issued as the '280 patent. The '122 application had relied
upon the benefit of the earlier filing date of the '280 patent under 35
USC § 120.
The examiner reviewing the '122 application found that the
'280 patent was a "printed publication" in existence more than one
year before the filing date of the '122 application. The examiner
also concluded that the '280 patent did not support the subject mat-
ter defined by the '122 application claims. The examiner therefore
concluded that the '280 patent was prior art with respect to the '122
application, and consequently rejected the '122 application claims
as unpatentable under § 102(b) based upon the '280 patent. The
rejection was affirmed by the Board.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the applicant argued that it
was legally anomalous for the examiner to first assert that the '280
patent failed to provide sufficient written description to support the
'122 application claims, and then to find that the '280 patent antici-
pated those very claims.
The Federal Circuit noted, however, that differences exist be-
tween the requirements of a claim-anticipating disclosure and the
requirements of a claim-supporting disclosure.69 Although a patent
might contain a disclosure satisfying the § 112 written description
requirement with respect to the claims in that patent, it could still
be § 102(b) prior art as to broader claims of a subsequent applica-
tion, even though it did not contain a disclosure satisfying the § 112
description requirement with respect to the anticipated broader
claims.70 This was the reason for the apparent legal anomaly noted
by the applicant in Chester, since the prior art '280 patent disclosed
a species of a broader genus sought to be claimed in the later '122
68. 906 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
69. In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967, 969-70 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
70. See id.
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application. Consequently, the Federal Circuit found no impermis-
sible anomaly or logical inconsistency in the rejection and affirmed
the Board's finding of anticipation.
V. DIVISIONAL APPLICATIONS - 35 USC § 121
A. Divisional Applications and Obviousness-Type Double
Patenting
The patent owner in the case of Gerber Garment Technology,
Inc. v. Lectra Systems, Inc.71 had filed a patent application in May
of 1969. During prosecution, the examiner had imposed a restric-
tion requirement between claims drawn to a cutting apparatus and
claims drawn to a work holding means.72 The patent owner elected
to prosecute the claims drawn to a cutting apparatus. The patent
was issued (the "parent patent") in February of 1970.
Prior to the issuance of the parent patent, the patent owner had
filed a divisional/continuation-in-part application containing claims
directed to the work holding means. These claims were subse-
quently amended during prosecution to include a "cutting blade"
limitation. The application ultimately issued as a patent (the "CIP
patent") in February of 1974.
The patent owner sued for infringement of the CIP patent.
The accused infringer filed a motion for summary judgment that the
claims of the CIP patent were invalid for obviousness-type double
patenting.73 The district court determined that: (1) 35 USC § 121
did not preclude the accused infringer from raising the issue of obvi-
ousness-type double patenting, because the claims of the CIP patent
were not "consonant" with the claims that were not elected under
the restriction requirement;74 and (2) the claims of the CIP patent
were invalid for obviousness-type double patenting in view of the
claims of the parent patent.
On appeal, the patent owner did not challenge the view that
71. 916 F.2d 683 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
72. 35 USC § 121 provides for restriction when "independent and distinct inventions"
are claimed in one application.
73. Obviousness-type double patenting is a judge-made rule that applies in situations in
which claims in two applications or patents are not drawn precisely to identical inventions,
but are drawn to inventions so alike as to render one obvious in view of the other and to
effectively extend the life of the patent having the earlier of the two issue dates. In re
Thorinaton, 418 F.2d 528, 534 (C.C.P.A. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1038 (1970).
74. Compliance with a restriction requirement means the claims in a divisional applica-
tion must be "consonant" with those not elected under the restriction requirement. See
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 804.01 (double patenting protec-
tion of 35 USC § 121 does not apply where the claims are not consonant with, i.e. "have been
changed in material respects from", the claims subject to the restriction requirement).
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obviousness-type double patenting would be present if 35 USC
§ 121 is rendered inapplicable by the non-consonance of the claims
in the CIP patent. The patent owner did argue, however, that the
third sentence of 35 USC § 121 precluded invalidity based on any-
thing in the parent patent, because the parent patent could not be
used as a reference against the CIP patent.7" Furthermore, the pat-
ent owner argued that the claims of the CIP patent were consonant
with the claims not elected in response to the restriction
requirement.
The Federal Circuit observed that the disclosure in a parent
patent cannot be used as a reference on which to reject a claim in a
divisional application under 35 USC § 103, because that disclosure
is the applicant's and is not part of the "prior art."76 However, the
claims in the parent patent may still be looked to in assessing com-
pliance with the prohibition against claiming the same invention in
two patents.
Moreover, the prohibition against using a parent patent as an
obviousness-type double patenting "reference" against a divisional
patent applies only if the application for the divisional patent was
filed as a result of a restriction requirement. Thus, to gain the bene-
fits of 35 USC § 121, the patent owner must limit the claims in the
divisional patent to the non-elected invention. The Federal Circuit
concluded that the patent owner in Gerber Garment had failed to do
SO.
The Federal Circuit noted that consonance requires that the
line of demarcation between the independent and distinct inventions
that prompted the restriction requirement be maintained through-
out prosecution. The claims subjected to the restriction require-
ment may be amended, but they cannot be amended so as to bring
them back over the line imposed in the restriction requirement. If
that line is crossed, then the prohibition of the third sentence of
§ 121 does not apply.77
By adding the "cutting blade" limitation to the claims of the
75. The third sentence of 35 USC § 121 provides:
A patent issuing on an application with respect to which a requirement for
restriction under this section has been made, or on an application filed as result
of such requirement, shall not be used as a reference either in the Patent and
Trademark Office or in the courts against a divisional application or against the
original application or any patent issued on either of them, if the divisional
application is filed before the issuance of the patent on the other application.
76. In Re Stempel, 241 F.2d 755, 760 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
77. Cf. In re Ziegler, 443 F.2d 1211, 1215 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (Section 121's prohibition
does not apply where restriction requirement withdrawn because divisional application no
longer filed "as a result of" the restriction).
1992]
40 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
CIP patent, the patent owner in Gerber Garment crossed back over
the line of demarcation between the "cutting apparatus" claims and
"work holding means" claims. In the application that resulted in
the CIP patent, the patent owner originally included claims di-
rected to the work holding means. After numerous amendments,
the patent owner incorporated into these claims the "cutting blade"
limitation of the elected claims in the parent patent. The patent
owner thereby rendered the claims of the CIP patent non-consonant
with those not elected in its response to the restriction requirement.
The Federal Circuit found that the inventions set forth in the
claims of the CIP patent were obvious variants of the inventions set
forth in the claims of the parent patent. Invalidation of the CIP
patent for obviousness-type double patenting was therefore appro-
priate, and the district court's grant of the accused infringer's mo-
tion for summary judgment was affirmed.
VI. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
A. Intent to Deceive May Not be Inferred Solely From Gross
Negligence
The case of Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Lemmon Co.,78 in-
volved an appeal from a district court judgment holding the subject
patent unenforceable and invalid due to the patentee's inequitable
conduct before the PTO. The district court found clear and con-
vincing evidence that, during prosecution, the applicant had been
grossly negligent in failing to bring to the attention of the PTO a
prior art reference that would have barred the issuance of the pat-
ent. The district court concluded that because gross negligence had
been found, the requirement of an intent to deceive the PTO (which
is necessary to sustain a charge of inequitable conduct) had been
satisfied.79
On appeal, the Federal Circuit stated that a finding of "gross
negligence" does not, in and of itself, justify an inference of intent to
deceive. The particular conduct must be viewed in light of all the
evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith and sufficient
culpability, to require a finding of intent to deceive.8"
Because the district court had failed to perform such an analy-
78. 906 F.2d 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
79. Id. at 688 (citing RCA Corp. v. Data General Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir.
1989) and Hewlett-Packard v. Bausch & Lomb, 882 F.2d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).




sis in determining the requisite intent to deceive, the Federal Circuit
vacated the judgment and remanded the case.
B. Effect of Inequitable Conduct on the Enforceability of
Related Patents
Inequitable conduct in procuring one patent in suit may re-
quire a holding that other, related patents in suit are unenforceable
where the inequitable conduct has a direct relation to the relief re-
quested. The Federal Circuit found such a direct relation between
the inequitable conduct and the relief requested in the case of Con-
solidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco International Ltd.81
The patentee in Consolidated Aluminum had sued for infringe-
ment of several patents relating to the manufacture and use of ce-
ramic foam filters for molten metal. Among the patents in suit were
U.S. Patent No. 3,893,917 ("the '917 patent"), U.S. Patent No.
3,962,081 ("the '081 patent"), U.S. Patent No. 4,024,212 ("the '212
patent") and U.S. Patent No. 4,075,303 ("the '303 patent").
The '917 patent was directed to an improved method of filter-
ing molten metal. The fiter was prepared by impregnating a flexi-
ble organic foam material with an aqueous ceramic slurry. The
district court found that the '917 patent misstated the composition
of the best mode slurry, and did not disclose the binder used in the
best mode slurry.
The '081 patent was directed to a molten metal filter. The
properties of the molten metal filter set forth in claim 1 of the '081
patent were the result of using the best mode slurry. The district
court found that claim 1 of the '081 patent was adequately sup-
ported under 35 USC § 112, by the disclosure of the best mode
slurry in the '081 specification.
However, during prosecution of the '081 patent application,
the claims had been rejected based upon the '917 patent. The pat-
entee had responded to this rejection by arguing that the '917 patent
neither disclosed nor suggested the claimed invention resulting from
use of the best mode slurry. This was an argument which the paten-
tee could not have made if the patentee had not concealed the best
mode slurry from the '917 patent. The concealment of the best
mode slurry from the '917 patent therefore provided a basis for the
patentee's successful arguments in prosecuting the '081 patent
application.
The '212 and '303 patent applications were continuations-in-
81. 910 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
1992]
42 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
part of the '081 patent application. All claims in both continuation
patents included the step of preparing the best mode slurry. Thus,
the patentee's concealment of the best mode slurry from the '917
patent "permeated" the prosecution of the other patents in suit.
The district court determined that the '917 patent was invalid
for failure to disclose the best mode and unenforceable because of
the patentee's inequitable conduct in concealing the best mode.82
The district court, applying the doctrine of unclean hands, fur-
ther held that the patentee's "broad pattern of inequitable conduct"
during prosecution of the '917 patent application so soiled the pat-
entee's hands as to render the '081, '212 and '303 patents equally
unenforceable.83 The patentee appealed from the judgment holding
the patents unenforceable and invalid.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that there was more
than mere relatedness of subject matter among the patents in suit.
The prosecution histories of the patents established that the paten-
tee's inequitable conduct in prosecuting the '917 patent had an "im-
mediate and necessary relation" to the equity sought by the
patentee (namely, the enforcement of the '081, '212 and '303 pat-
ents).84 The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the district
court's application of inequitable conduct considerations to the
'081, '212 and '303 patents was not an abuse of discretion, and af-
firmed the district court holding that the '081, '212 and '303 patents
unenforceable.
C. Inequitable Conduct Affects all Claims
Whether the district court properly refused to enforce a patent
due to inequitable conduct85 before the PTO was the issue presented
82. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 716 F. Supp. 316, 323 (N.D. Ill.
1989).
83. Id. at 332 (citing Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945) and Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S.
240, 245-46 (1933) [hereinafter Keystone Driller]). See also Mathis v. Hydro-Air Indus. Inc.,
1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513, 1529 (C.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd, 818 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987).
84. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., supra note 77, at 810-11 (citing
Keystone Driller, id. at 245).
85. Inequitable conduct is shown by production of clear and convincing evidence of: (I)
material prior art; (2) knowledge chargeable to the patent applicant of prior art and its mate-
riality; and (3) applicant's failure to disclose the prior art to the PTO with intent to mislead.
FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415, (Fed. Cir. 1987). Information is mate-
rial if there exists a "substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it
important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent." J.P. Stevens &
Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985);
37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1983).
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to the Federal Circuit in Fox Industries, Inc. v. Structural Preserva-
tion Systems, Inc.86
More than one year prior to the patent's application filing date,
the patent owner had published a sales brochure that had been used
as source material in drafting the application. The brochure, which
was never disclosed to the PTO, was found by the district court to
teach every feature specified in the claims of the patent except one,
and to be more relevant than any other reference cited during
prosecution.
The patent owner argued that materiality and intent only apply
to the claims that are finally allowed to issue. The Federal Circuit
disagreed, noting that a duty of candor extends throughout the pat-
ent's entire prosecution history. When determining inequitable con-
duct, a trial court may therefore properly look beyond the final
claims to their antecedents. The Federal Circuit thus concluded
that a breach of the duty of candor early in the prosecution may
render unenforceable all claims which issue from the same or a re-
lated application.
The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in finding that the brochure had been withheld from
the PTO with the intent to deceive.87 With respect to the material-
ity of the reference, the Federal Circuit, noting that the district
court found several claims invalid under 35 USC § 102(b), indicated
that the anticipation of a claim in a patent based on a withheld
reference satisfies the most stringent standard of materiality.88
The patent owner's argument that Rule 5689 did not govern the
duty of candor because the Rule was promulgated after the first
prosecuting patent attorney (who knew of the brochure and did not
disclose it) ceased to be involved with the applications, was found
by the Federal circuit to lack merit. The Federal Circuit noted that
Rule 56 was actually a codification of existing PTO policy on fraud
and inequitable conduct90 and that, in any event, the prevailing
standards of inequitable conduct would have required disclosure of
the brochure.9' Furthermore, the Federal Circuit noted that the
86. 922 F.2d 801 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
87. The Federal Circuit reviews inequitable conduct under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard. Kingsdown Medical Consultants Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 876. The Court de-
termined that the patent owner's testimony fully supported the finding of intent to deceive.
88. See Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
89. 37 CFR § 1.56.
90. 42 Fed. Reg. 5,588, 5,589 (Jan. 28, 1977). See also In re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886, 890
n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
91. See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 792-97 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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patent owner himself owed the same duty of candor to the PTO as
did the patent attorney.92
Thus, the Federal Circuit held that the district court properly
concluded that the patent at issue was unenforceable due to inequi-
table conduct before the PTO.
D. Inequitable Conduct and Amendments Under 37 CFR
§ .312
Intent to deceive must be determined in light of the realities of
patent practice, and not as a matter of strict liability.93 Given the
ease with which a relatively routine act of patent prosecution can be
portrayed as intended to mislead or deceive, clear and convincing
evidence of conduct sufficient to support an inference of culpable
intent is required.
The issue raised in Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp. 94
was whether the prosecution history of the subject patent provided
such clear and convincing evidence of conduct sufficient to support
an inference of culpable intent.
The prosecution history showed that after the PTO issued a
notice of allowance, but before payment of the issue fee, the paten-
tee had requested amendment of the descriptive text of the subject
patent application (as authorized by 37 CFR § 1.312). The patentee
filed a four-page amendment, containing twenty-five specific
changes to the specification.
The district court held that five of the requested changes al-
tered the scope of the original disclosure and the scope of the previ-
ously allowed claims.9" The district court found that the patentee
had intentionally misrepresented the purpose and nature of these
amendments, and that this misrepresentation was material to pat-
entability. The district court therefore held all of the claims of the
subject patent unenforceable based on inequitable conduct before
the PTO.
On appeal, the patentee argued that the amendments simply
92. The Court noted that the duty of candor rests on "the inventor... and on every
other individual who is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the appli-
cation .... 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
93. Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 186 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
94. 908 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 296 (1990).
95. These five changes, with the changes to the text italicized, were as follows: (1) a
wired or like read-only memory; (2) read-only memory containing a hardwired or otherwise
fixed program; (3) a hardwired orfixed program; (4) a wired or like ROM of the form just
mentioned is unalterable; (5) the wired-in (or otherwise fixed) program in the ROM.
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conformed the descriptive text of the specification to the claims (as
required by the rules of PTO practice) and thus could not, as a
matter of law, broaden the disclosure and the scope of the claims.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the patentee. The original
claims, as filed, are part of the patent specification.9 6 At the time
the patentee filed the amendment in accordance with 37 CFR
§ 1.312, the claims had already been examined and had been al-
lowed substantially as filed. The Federal Circuit found that the sub-
ject matter added to the descriptive text by the amendment under
37 CFR § 1.312 was already in the allowed claims, and was there-
fore already part of the patent disclosure.
Considering all of the circumstances, including indications of
good faith, the Federal Circuit was left with a definite and firm con-
viction that the district court had made a mistake regarding the
patentee's state of mind when it filed the amendment under 37 CFR
§ 1.312. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that the dis-
trict court's finding that the patentee had intended to mislead or
deceive the PTO was clearly erroneous, and the district court's
holding of unenforceability on this ground was reversed.
E. Jury Instructions on Inequitable Conduct
The case of Modine Manufacturing Co. v. Allen Group, Inc. 97
involved an appeal concerning a final judgment of the district court
that the infringer had willfully infringed the patent, and that the
patent was not invalid or unenforceable. 98 The patent owner had
been accused of failing to disclose to the PTO information as to its
own prior art research and of concealing the fact that the named
inventor actually had the help of unnamed co-inventors. The case
had been tried to a jury, which returned special verdicts finding that
the infringer had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the patent was invalid, or that it was unenforceable for inequi-
table conduct.
On appeal, the infringer argued that the district court had
erred in determining that the patent was not unenforceable for ineq-
uitable conduct in the prosecution of the patent application.
The Federal Circuit noted that establishing inequitable con-
duct for submitting false information or for failing to disclose infor-
mation to the PTO during prosecution requires proof by clear and
96. 35 USC § 112, 2; In re Benno, 768 F.2d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
97. 917 F.2d 538 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2017 (1991).
98. Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210 (N.D. Cal.
1989).
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convincing evidence of two facts: that the information was material
and that the patentee acted with intent to deceive.99
The record in Modine included evidence tending to show that
any failure to disclose was inadvertent, and that the inventor would
have had no motive to intentionally lie about inventorship because
the company would own any patent that might issue. The persons
accused of inequitable conduct actually testified as witnesses, and
the Federal Circuit found that the jury's assessment of their charac-
ter and credibility was entitled to great deference. The Federal Cir-
cuit therefore concluded that the infringer had not demonstrated
that the determination that it failed to prove inequitable conduct
was an abuse of discretion.
The infringer further argued that the district court's jury in-
structions constituted reversible error, because they submitted the
issue of inequitable conduct to the jury and because they contained
an incorrect legal test for determining whether inequitable conduct
had occurred. The Federal Circuit held, however, that the in-
fringer's failure to object to the jury instructions at trial precludes it
under Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from chal-
lenging the jury instructions on appeal, both as to their submission
of the ultimate question of inequitable conduct to the jury and as to
their content indicating that gross negligence was not sufficient to
show intent.
The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the ruling of the district
court.
VII. EXTENSION OF PATENT TERM - 35 USC § 156
A. Definition of "Product" Under 35 USC § 156
For a patent to be eligible for a term extension under 35 USC
§ 156, the product must have been subject to a regulatory review
period and the permission for the commercial marketing or use of
the product after such regulatory review period must have been the
first permitted commercial marketing or use of the "product" under
the provision of law under which such regulatory review period oc-
curred.1°° The patent statute defines "product" as "the active in-
gredient of a new drug,... including any salt or ester of the active
ingredient . . ."101
The question of how the term "product" under 35 USC § 156
99. Kingsdown Medical Consultants, supra note 80, at 872.
100. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) & (5).
101. 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)(2).
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should be interpreted was the principal issue presented in the case
of Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg.10 2 The subject patent in
Glaxo issued in 1981 and claimed cefuroxime axetil, an antibiotic
drug. The antibiotic drug cefuroxime axetil is marketed commer-
cially, in tablet form, as CEFTIN. The Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) approved CEFTIN in 1987.
The patented cefuroxime axetil is an ester of cefuroxime. Two
of the salts of cefuroxime are marketed, for intravenous and intra-
muscular use, as ZINACEF and KEFUROX. The FDA approved
ZINACEF in 1983 and various dosage strengths of KEFUROX in
1986 and 1987.
Neither ZINACEF nor KEFUROX are salts or esters of the
patented cefuroxime axetil. However, after being orally adminis-
tered, CEFTIN combines with digestive substances in the human
body to produce the same therapeutically active substance con-
tained in both ZINACEF and KEFUROX.
The patent owner sought a patent term extension for the sub-
ject cefuroxime axetil patent. The Commissioner denied the patent
term extension, contending that CEFTIN was not the "first permit-
ted commercial marketing or use" of the "product."
The Commissioner took the position that "product" in 35 USC
§ 156 should not be interpreted literally to encompass only an ac-
tive ingredient or a salt or ester of an active ingredient. Instead,
"product" should be interpreted broadly to encompass any new
chemical "entity" or new active "moiety." Under this broad defini-
tion, the term "product" would encompass all acid, salt, or ester
forms of a single therapeutically active substance, even if the drug,
before being administered, contained only other substances. In the
case of the drug CEFTIN, for example, the therapeutically active
substance found in ZINACEF and KEFUROX is not present in
CEFTIN before being administered. However, after being adminis-
tered, CEFTIN combines with digestive substances to produce the
same therapeutically active substance found in both ZINACEF and
KEFUROX. The Commissioner therefore concluded that the 1987
FDA approval of CEFTIN was not the first permitted commercial
marketing or use of the "product," because ZINACEF and
KEFUROX had previously been approved.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the operative
terms used in the § 156(f)(2) definition of "product" are clear and
unambiguous. The legislative history provides no "extraordinary
102. 894 F.2d 392 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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showing of contrary intentions" to this clear and unambiguous
meaning.103 All that Congress left to the Commissioner's technical
expertise was determining whether any patented chemical com-
pound named in a patent term extension application fell within the
statutory definition of "product," but not what "product" was to
mean. Consequently, the Federal Circuit was not required to defer
to the Commissioner's interpretation of "product," even where that
interpretation was reasonable and not clearly contrary to Congres-
sional intent."1~
The patent statute defines "product" as "the active ingredient
of a new drug .... including any salt or ester of the active ingredi-
ent."1" 5 It was undisputed that neither ZINACEF nor KEFUROX
was the "active ingredient" of the new drug CEFTIN. It was also
undisputed that neither ZINACEF nor KEFUROX was a "salt or
ester" of cefuroxime axetil (the active ingredient of CEFTIN).
Consequently, the Federal Circuit concluded that CEFTIN was the
"first permitted commercial marketing or use" of the "product" as
defined in 35 USC § 156.
B. Determination of "Regulatory Review Period"
The patent owner in the case of Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v.
Quigg1o6 owned a patent claiming pentoxifylline, a pharmaceutical
product for human use having the tradename Trental. The patent
issued on June 5, 1973, but the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") did not approve Trental for commercial marketing until
August 30, 1984. Thus, more than ten years elapsed between the
time the patent issued and the date Trental could be marketed.
The patent owner applied for a patent term extension under 35
USC § 156 on October 29, 1984. The PTO determined that the
patent owner was not entitled to a term extension for the patent
because Trental had not been subject to a regulatory review period
within the meaning of § 156(a)(4). The Commissioner therefore de-
nied the patent owner's request for reconsideration. 107
103. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984); Fisons Ple v. Quigg, 876 F.2d 99,
101 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
104. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984) (Congress did not have specific intention so courts defer to reasonable choice
of agency); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116,
126 (1985) (agency interpretation reasonable and will be followed unless contrary intent by
Congress).
105. 35 USC § 156(0(2).
106. 917 F.2d 522 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
107. In re Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 638 (1985).
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The patent owner appealed the Commissioner's decision to the
district court, and the parties submitted cross-motions for summary
judgment. The district court granted the Commissioner's motion
for summary judgment.108 The issue the patent owner bought on
appeal was whether the district court had erred in determining that
the Trental patent was ineligible for a term extension under 35 USC
§ 156.
The record indicated that the patent owner had satisfied all of
the requirements for a patent term extension under § 156(a)(1)-(3)
and (a)(5). The patent owner had applied for the extension within
60 days after Trental received FDA approval, pursuant to
§ 156(d)(1). The only question was whether Trental had undergone
a "regulatory review period"109 pursuant to § 156(a)(4). The pri-
mary dispute on appeal concerned the meaning and effect of the
emphasized language in § 156(g)(1)(A) "to which the limitation de-
scribed in paragraph (6) applies."
The Commissioner argued that the language "to which the
limitation described in paragraph (6) applies" in § 156(g)(1)(A) in-
corporates the paragraph (6) limitations into the definition of a reg-
ulatory review period. Thus, if none of the limitations in paragraph
(6) applies, then no regulatory review period is established and no
patent term extension is available.
The patent owner argued that the requirements of paragraph
(6) are not a part of the definition of a regulatory review period and
are thus not a part of the statute's eligibility requirements. Instead,
the paragraph (6) limitations are caps on the length of a term exten-
sion for a patent which has already been determined to be eligible
for an extension pursuant to §§ 156(a) and (g)(1)(B). The patent
owner further argued that Congress's failure to place a cap on the
length of term extensions for the Trental patent and the small
number of other drug patents which received FDA approval shortly
before the passage of 35 USC § 156 was simply an oversight.
The Federal Circuit, agreeing with the patent owner, found
that Congress intended 35 USC § 156(g)(1)-(3) to define the "regu-
latory review period" and for 35 USC § 156(g)(6) to be a limitation
108. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 724 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Va. 1989).
109. The "regulatory review period" for a human drug such as Trental is defined in
§ 156(g)(1)(A) as "the period described in subparagraph (B) to which the limitation described
in paragraph (6) applies" (emphasis added). Subparagraph (B) provides that the length of the
regulatory review period is the sum of (i) the testing phase period and (ii) the approval phase
period for the drug. The formula in subparagraph (B) yielded a 9.5 year regulatory review
period, which was then reduced by § 156(c) to yield a 6.8-year term extension for the Trental
patent.
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on the extension term. Legislative history explicitly indicating that
no patent term extension may be greater than five years had no
bearing on how Congress intended to define a regulatory review pe-
riod under 35 USC § 156(g)(1)-(3).
Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that subparagraph (B) de-
scribes the regulatory review period and paragraph (6) describes the
limitation which applies to that regulatory review period. The Fed-
eral Circuit acknowledged that the resulting 6.8-year term extension
for the Trental patent was a windfall for the patent owner that was
probably not contemplated by Congress, but that Congress had sim-
ply neglected to assign any limitation on the length of a term exten-
sion for the small number of patents for drugs which received
approval shortly before enactment of 35 USC § 156.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the
case with instructions for the Commissioner to grant the patent
owner a 6.8-year term extension for the patent.
VIII. DESIGN PATENTS - 35 USC § 171
A. "Normal and Intended Use" Includes the Sale and
Display of an Article
The case of In re Webb 110 involved an appeal from a decision
of the Board affirming the final rejection of the sole claim of a de-
sign patent application. The claim was directed to the ornamental
design for an implantable hip stem prosthesis. The Board affirmed
the final rejection of the claim as being directed to unpatentable sub-
ject matter under 35 USC § 171 because the prosthesis was not visi-
ble in what the Board considered to be its normal and intended use.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that the issuance of a
design patent is limited by 35 USC § 171 to a design that is "orna-
mental." The general rule presumes the absence of ornamentality
when an article cannot be observed in its normal and intended
use.111 This general rule is not, however, dispositive.'1 2 In each
case, a determination must be made as to whether, at some point in
the life of the article, an occasion arises when the appearance of the
article becomes a matter of concern.
The Federal Circuit construed the term "normal and intended
use" as defining a period of time in an article's life, beginning after
110. 916 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
111. In re Cornwall, 230 F.2d 457, 459 (C.C.P.A. 1956); In re Stevens, 173 F.2d 1015
(C.C.P.A. 1949).
112. Larson v. Classic Corp., 683 F. Supp. 1202, 1202-1203 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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completion of manufacture or assembly and ending with the ulti-
mate destruction, loss, or disappearance of the article. This period
of time includes all commercial uses of the article prior to its ulti-
mate destination, including the sale and display of the article.
The record in Webb showed that the design of the subject hip
prosthesis was displayed in advertisements and at trade shows, and
that surgeons were made aware of differing brands and types of
prostheses through such advertisements and displays. Thus, even
though the design of the hip prosthesis was hidden from view when
it arrived at the final use of its functional life, the design of the hip
prosthesis was not always concealed in its normal and intended use.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the
Board and remanded the case.
IX. REISSUE - 35 U.S.C. § 251
A. The Recapture Rule
Under the Recapture Rule, a patentee is barred from acquir-
ing, through a reissue patent, claims that are of the same scope as
claims that were canceled from the parent patent application.113
The primary issue presented in the case of Whittaker Corp. v. UNR
Industries, Inc. was whether the district court properly granted
summary judgment in holding a reissue patent invalid under the
Recapture Rule.114
During prosecution of the parent patent application, the patent
owner cancelled the originally filed claims by adding two amend-
ments to these claims. During the prosecution of the reissue patent
application, the patent owner removed the first of these two amend-
ments from the claims, while retaining the second amendment in
the claims of the reissue patent.
The accused infringer argued that the second amendment
merely made explicit a requirement that was alreadly implicit or
inherent in the claims that were canceled from the parent patent
application. Consequently, the claims of the reissue patent did not
differ in scope from the claims that were canceled from the parent
patent application. The patent owner argued that the second
amendment was in fact a significant limitation on the scope of the
claims, and thereby made the claims of the reissue patent narrower
in scope than the claims canceled from the parent patent
application.
113. Ball Corp. v. United States, 729 F.2d 1429, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
114. 911 F.2d 709 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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The issue on appeal was whether the district court's determina-
tion, on summary judgment, that the claims of the reissue patent
did not differ materially from the claims that were surrendered to
obtain the allowance of the parent patent reflected a correct con-
struction of the claims.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had erred
in holding that the claims of the application that resulted in the
parent patent were not narrowed by the second amendment. The
specification, the prosecution history, the other claims and the affi-
davit of the inventor, made it clear that the second amendment re-
sulted in narrower claims than those propounded in the parent
patent application.
Since the claims of the reissue patent were narrower in scope
than the claims of the application that resulted in the parent patent,
the reissue patent was not invalid under the recapture rule. The
Federal Circuit therefore reversed the grant of summary judgment
and remanded for further proceedings.
B. Failure to File a Divisional Application May Not be
Correctable by Reissue
The issue presented in In re Watkinson I" was whether the
Board correctly affirmed the rejection of all claims in a reissue ap-
plication under 35 USC § 251 for lack of statutory error. The error
alleged was the acquiescence in a restriction requirement in the
original application.
The original application was filed in July, 1982. During prose-
cution, the examiner subjected the original application to a restric-
tion requirement. In response to the restriction requirement, the
applicant elected certain claims for further prosecution and re-
served the right to file a divisional application containing claims di-
rected to the non-elected invention. The applicant then canceled
the non-elected claims. The original patent issued in November,
1984, without a divisional application having been filed.
A reissue application was fied in January, 1986. The reissue
application included claims corresponding to those in the original
patent as well as claims corresponding to those canceled from the
original application. The reissue applicant alleged that the restric-
tion requirement in the original application had been improper, and
that acquiescence in the restriction requirement was an error cor-
rectable by reissue.
115. 900 F.2d 230 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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The examiner rejected all of the claims in the reissue applica-
tion under 35 USC § 251 for lack of a statutory error. The Board
affirmed the examiner's rejection.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that a restriction re-
quirement is a matter within the discretion of the examiner. It is
not equivalent to a rejection of claims.1 16 Consequently, the proper
time for the reissue applicant to have challenged the merits of the
restriction requirement was during the prosecution of the original
application.1 17 After acquiescing in the restriction requirement,
canceling the non-elected claims and allowing the original patent to
issue, the reissue applicant had lost the opportunity to challenge the
propriety of the restriction requirement. The Federal Circuit there-
fore concluded that neither it nor the Board had jurisdiction to re-
view the merits of the restriction requirement.
The Federal Circuit further held that, regardless of the propri-
ety of the underlying restriction requirement, the failure to file a
divisional application is not an error correctable by reissue under 35
USC § 251. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the rejection of
all of the claims in the reissue application under 35 USC § 251 for
lack of a statutory error.
X. INFRINGEMENT - 35 USC § 271
A. State Immunity From Infringement Suit
In the case of Chew v. State of California 11I the patent owner
brought suit for infringement against the State of California, alleg-
ing that the State required testing of automobile engine exhaust
emissions by a process which infringed the subject patent. 19 The
State moved for dismissal, asserting immunity from suit in federal
court under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The Federal Circuit determined that, although the federal
courts have been given exclusive jurisdiction over the asserted pat-
ent infringement claim, the congressional intent to abrogate a state's
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment must be stated explic-
itly. The relevant section of the patent statute, 35 USC § 271(a),
states: "whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented
invention.., infringes the patent." (Emphasis added.) The Federal
116. See In re Hengehold, 440 F.2d 1395, 1404 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
117. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.143, 1.144 (1989).
118. 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 44 (1990).
119. The patent owner brought suit in federal district court for patent infringement dam-
ages against the state under the patent statute, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 and under 28 USC
§ 1338(a).
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Circuit found that the general term "whoever" is not the requisite
unmistakable language of congressional intent necessary to abrogate
a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. In the absence of such
explicit abrogation within the patent statute, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the district court's dismissal must be affirmed.
The issue of whether a state is immune from suit for patent
infringement under the patent statutes was also presented in the
case of Jacobs Wind Electric Company, Inc. v. Florida Department
of Transportation.1 20 The case had been dismissed by the district
court on the ground that the accused infringer (the State of Florida)
was immune from suit by reason of the Eleventh Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.
The patent owner in Jacobs Wind attempted to distinguish
Chew by arguing that the holding in Chew was limited to suits
against a state by a nonresident. The Federal Circuit found that the
scope of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
is not so limited, noting that the Supreme Court has held that Elev-
enth Amendment immunity bars suit by a resident or nonresident,
absent waiver or Congress' legitimate exercise of the power to abro-
gate that immunity. 121
The Federal Circuit also found that the patent owner's argu-
ment that it would be precluded from obtaining a remedy did not
have merit. The court noted noting that the patent owner was free
to seek remedy through the state government or to assert a "tak-
ings" claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 12 2 Thus
the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the patent owner's suit.
B. Design Patent Infringement and the "Point of Novelty"
Analysis
The case of Winner International Corp. v. Wolo Manufacturing
Corp. 123 involved the alleged infringement of a design patent. The
district court had granted the accused infringer's motion for sum-
mary judgment based on noninfringement. In concluding that the
120. 919 F.2d 726 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
121. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472, 479-88
(1987); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
122. The Federal Circuit noted that counsel for the state indicated the patent owner
could have sought relief in the Florida Legislature through a claims bill, but chose instead to
file a patent infringement suit in U.S. district court. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 11.065 (West
1988). Further, the Court noted that the patent owner could also assert a "takings" claim
against the state under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (Fifth Amendment "taking" claim asserted against U.S. for al-
leged disclosure of trade secrets.); Chew v. California, supra note 118, at 336.
123. 905 F.2d 375 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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design patent was not infringed, the district court utilized the
"point of novelty" analysis set forth in Litton Systems, Inc. v. Whirl-
pool Corp. 24 Focussing on those aspects of the patented design
which distinguished the design from the prior art, the district court
found that the differences between the patented design and the ac-
cused design were sufficiently numerous and substantial that a rea-
sonable jury could not have found infringement.
On appeal, the patent owner argued that the district court
erred in not considering the overall confignration and appearance of
the patented design as a "point of novelty."
The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that the purpose of the
"point of novelty" analysis is to focus on those aspects of a design
which render the design different from the prior art.125 Considera-
tion of the overall appearance of a design, without regard to the
prior art, would eviscerate this purpose. The judgment of the dis-
trict court was therefore affirmed.
126
C. Inducing Infringement
The subject patent in the case of Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,27 was directed to X-Y plotters. The accused
infringer, a manufacturer of X-Y plotters, had sold its plotter divi-
sion to a third party purchaser. The sales agreement stated that the
accused infringer would indemnify the purchaser against liability
for infringment, in addition to working jointly with the purchaser
toward developing a plotter that would not infringe the subject
patent.
The patent owner sued the accused infringer for direct in-
fringement covering the period of time prior to the sale of its plotter
division, and for active inducement of infringement under 35 USC
§ 271(b) for the period of time subsequent to the sale of its plotter
division. The accused infringer admitted direct infringment, but de-
nied that its activities surrounding the sale to the purchaser consti-
tuted active inducement of infringement. The district court held
that the accused infringer had not actively induced infringement of
the patent, and the patent owner appealed.
124. 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
125. Id.
126. Nor did the Federal Circuit find that a genuine dispute of fact as to infringement
was established by affidavit evidence of a single instance of actual confusion. This was espe-
cially true because the affidavit did not indicate whether the confusion was caused by those
aspects which distinguished the patented design from the prior art. Winner, supra note 123, at
376.
127. 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that there is a distinc-
tion with respect to the level of knowledge or intent required to find
active inducement of infringement under § 271(b) in contrast to
contributory infringement under § 271(c). A finding of contribu-
tory infringment under § 271(c) merely requires proof of a defend-
ant's knowledge (not intent) that the accused activity causes
infringement. In contrast, a finding of active inducement under
§ 271(b) requires proof of a defendant's actual intent to cause the
acts that constitute the infringement.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the record in Hewlett-
Packard Co. failed to show the requisite proof of actual intent to
cause the infringement on the part of the accused infringer. On the
contrary, the record indicated that the accused infringer was merely
interested in divesting itself of its plotter division at the highest pos-
sible price, and had no interest in what the purchaser did with the
division after its sale.
The Federal Circuit viewed the agreement between the accused
infringer and the purchaser to work together to find a way to avoid
infringement as establishing, if anything, an intent by the accused
infringer not to induce infringement. Although the indemnification
agreement facilitated the sale of the plotter division, the record did
not indicate that the accused infringer had used the indemnification
agreement to induce infringement by the purchaser.128
The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the district court's deci-
sion holding the accused infringer not liable for actively inducing
infringement of the patent for the period subsequent to the sale of
the plotter division.
D. Requirement of a True Case or Controversy
The issue presented in the case of Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge
Wire Cloth Co. "' was whether it is appropriate for a district court
to grant a motion for summary judgment of non-infringement
where there is no evidence that any allegedly infringing product had
been made, used or sold at the time the complaint was filed.
After the close of discovery, the accused infringer had moved
for summary judgment of non-infringement based on four exhibits
representing possible constructions of products. The record con-
128. The mere existence of an indemnification agreement generally does not establish the
requisite intent to induce infringement. However, such intent may be inferred when the pri-
mary purpose is to overcome the deterrent effect that the patent laws have on potential in-
fringers. Id. at 1470.
129. 919 F.2d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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tained no evidence that any of the four possible constructions had
ever been made, used, or sold when the complaint was filed.
The Federal Circuit found that the accused infringer was es-
sentially asking the district court, through its summary judgment
motion, to provide advice as to whether, if made and sold, any of
the four possible constructions would infringe the subject patents.
The Federal Circuit noted that the Federal Courts do not decide
hypothetical fact situations or issue advisory opinions. 130 Accord-
ingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgement
and remanded the case.
XI. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
A. The Effect of Prior Art on the Doctrine of Equivalents
The subject patent in Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geof-
frey & Associates131 was directed to a particular configuration of
dimples on a golf ball cover. In an infringement action brought by
the patentee, the district court had denied the accused infringer's
motion for JNOV on infringement. On appeal, the issue was
whether the district court had erred as a matter of law by denying
the motion for JNOV.
The single theory of liability presented by the patentee was in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents.132 The accused in-
fringer argued that the doctrine of equivalents should not be applied
to cover the accused golf ball, since the accused golf ball was virtu-
ally identical to a known prior art golf ball. Therefore, to allow the
patent to reach the accused golf ball under the doctrine of
equivalents would improperly encompass the prior art golf ball as
well.
The Federal Circuit noted that, although the doctrine of
equivalents does not expand the claims,133 the range of permissible
130. A true case or controversy is required. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
131. 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 537 (1990) (hereinafter "Wil-
son Sporting Goods").
132. Under the doctrine of equivalents, infringement may be found if an accused product
"performs substantially the same overall function or work, in substantially the same way, to
obtain substantially the same overall result as the claimed invention." Pennwalt Corp. v.
Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct.
1226 (1988), and cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1474 (1988). Even if this test is met, however, there
can be no infringement if the asserted scope of equivalency of what is literally claimed would
encompass the prior art. Id.; Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Medical Indus., 888 F.2d 815,
821 (Fed. Cir. 1989). This issue-whether an asserted range of equivalents would cover what
is already in the public domain-is one of law, which the Federal Circuit reviews de novo.
Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
133. Prior to Wilson Sporting Goods, the Federal Circuit had characterized claims as
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equivalents of the claims may nevertheless be limited by the prior
art. The reason why the prior art may limit the range of equivalents
is that a patentee cannot be allowed to obtain, under the doctrine of
equivalents, coverage which the patentee could not lawfully have
obtained from the PTO by the literal claims. The doctrine of
equivalents exists to prevent a fraud on a patent, not to give a paten-
tee something which could not lawfully have been obtained from
the PTO.134 Thus, since prior art always limits what an inventor
could have claimed, it limits the range of permissible equivalents of
a claim.
The Federal Circuit proposed a test for determining whether
prior art restricts the range of permissible equivalents. The test re-
quires consideration of the patentability of a hypothetical claim that
is sufficient in scope to literally cover the accused product. Under
this test, the issue is whether the hypothetical claim could have been
allowed by the PTO over the prior art. If the hypothetical claim
could have been allowed, then the prior art is not a bar to infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents. If the hypothetical claim
could not have been allowed, then it is improper to permit the pat-
entee to obtain comparable claim coverage under the doctrine of
equivalents.135
The specific issue presented in Wilson Sporting Goods was
therefore whether the patentee had proven that a hypothetical claim
broad enough to cover the accused golf ball could have been patent-
able. The Federal Circuit held that this hypothetical claim, consid-
ered as a whole, could not have been patentable because it would
have been obvious in view of the prior art. Consequently, the paten-
being "expanded" or "broadened" under the doctrine of equivalents. See, eg., Intervet Am.,
Inc. v. Kee-Vet Laboratories, Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Brenner v. United
States, 773 F.2d 306, 308 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 720
F.2d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932 (Fed. Cir.
1983). In Wilson Sporting Goods the Federal Circuit expressly abandoned this terminology,
explaining that the doctrine of equivalents, by definition, involves going beyond any permissi-
ble interpretation of the claim language; le., it involves determining whether the accused
product is "equivalent" to what is described by the claim language. Therefore, to say that the
doctrine of equivalents extends or enlarges the claims is a contradiction in terms. The scope
of patent protection defined by the claims remains the same. The doctrine expands the right
to exclude to "equivalents" of what is claimed..
134. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (herein-
after "Graver Tank").
135. Under the Wilson Sporting Goods test, the burden is on the patent owner to prove
that the asserted hypothetical claim would not encompass the prior art. This burden does not
undermine the presumed validity of the patentee's "actual" patent claims. The presumption
of validity attaching to the actual claims remains, regardless of whether the patentee per-
suades the court that it is entitled to the range of equivalents sought.
[Vol. 8
PATENT LAW DEVEL OPMENS
tee's independent claim 1 could not be given a range of equivalents
broad enough to encompass the accused golf ball. The Federal Cir-
cuit therefore reversed the judgment of infringement of claim 1.
However, the conclusion that independent claim 1 was not in-
fringed under the doctrine of equivalents was not the end of the
infringement analysis. The Federal Circuit went on to address the
question of infringement of the dependent claims under the doctrine
of equivalents. The Federal Circuit explained that because the de-
pendent claims included limitations which made them narrower in
scope than claim 1, it did not automatically follow that the range of
equivalents of the dependent claims would encompass the prior art.
In other words, despite a finding that independent claim 1 was not
infringed, it was still necessary to consider the issue of infringement
of the dependent claims under the doctrine of equivalents.
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that this result initially ap-
pears to contradict a basic axiom of patent law that a dependent
claim cannot be infringed unless the independent claim from which
it depends is also infringed.136 The Federal Circuit explained that
this basic principle remains true for cases in which the noninfringe-
ment of the independent claim is a consequence of the absence of
certain claim limitations, or their substantial equivalents, from the
accused product. In such cases a dependent claim, which incorpo-
rates by reference the limitations of the independent claim, will sim-
ilarly not be infringed.137
Where, however, the noninfringement of an independent claim
is due solely to the fact that the asserted range of equivalents of the
independent claim would encompass the prior art, the dependent
claims must still be analyzed to determine whether they can be in-
fringed under the doctrine of equivalents.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court erred in
denying the accused infringer's motion for JNOV on infringement,
because, as a matter of law, a range of equivalents broad enough to
cover the accused golf balls would also have encompassed the prior
art. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment of in-
fringement and vacated the judgment that the claims were not
proven invalid.13
136. Wahpeton Canvas Co., Inc. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1553 & n.9 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
137. See id., for example, in which the Federal Circuit affirmed a judgment of nonin-
fringement of the independent claims on the rationale that the accused product failed to
include particular claim limitations or their substantial equivalents.
138. Another issue presented by Wilson Sporting Goods was the timeliness of the ac-
cused infringer's motion for JNOV. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) states that a party may move for
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B. Interpretation of Prosecution Arguments May Affect
Application of Doctrine
The subject patent in Hormone Research Foundation, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc. 139 was directed to a synthetic, 190 amino acid se-
quence exhibiting growth promoting properties. An example of the
disclosed synthetic amino acid was illustrated in Figure 2 of the
patent. Several of the patent claims expressly recited "a sequence
corresponding to Figure 2" and "a structure corresponding to Fig.
2."
The accused infringer produced a human growth hormone
(HGH) product called Protropin. It was undisputed that Protropin
contained 192 amino acids instead of 190. In that respect, Pro-
tropin differed from the structure illustrated in Figure 2 of the
patent.
The accused infringer moved for summary judgment of nonin-
fringement, alleging that it had not infringed those claims which
expressly recited "a sequence corresponding to Figure 2" and "a
structure corresponding to Fig. 2" because Protropin did not con-
tain a compound having the structure of Figure 2. The district
court agreed, and held that the accused infringer did not infringe
the Figure 2 claims." The patent owner appealed from the district
court's grant of summary judgment.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district
court's determination that the claim language "a sequence corre-
sponding to Figure 2" and "a structure corresponding to Fig. 2"
required identity in all respects to Figure 2 was consistent with both
the specification and the prosecution history. Accordingly, the Fed-
eral Circuit affirmed that part of the district court's judgment hold-
ing that the accused infringer's product did not literally infringe the
Figure 2 claims of the patent.
However, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court
had not correctly decided the issue of infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents. One of the references cited during prosecution
of the patent depicted a different, although very close, structure of
natural HGH. During prosecution the applicant had argued that
JNOV "[n]ot later than 10 days after entry ofjudgment." The accused infringer's motion for
JNOV was served upon opposing counsel on the 10th day after entry of judgment, but was
not filed in the district court until the following day. The Federal Circuit, in a ruling of first
impression, held that the motion for JNOV was timely.
139. 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert dismissed, 111 S. Ct. 1434 (1991).
140. Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Cal.
1988).
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the claims were "limited to the structures shown in the drawings
[were] are not directed broadly to HGH or its derivatives." '141
The district court interpreted the applicant's prosecution argu-
ment to mean that the claims were confined to the specific structure
of Figure 2, and that the cited reference was not anticipatory be-
cause it depicted the different structure of natural HGH. The dis-
trict court, therefore, held that prosecution history estoppel
precluded recovery under the doctrine of equivalents, and did not
decide the issue of whether the accused Protropin was equivalent to
the claimed invention.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court's deter-
mination (that the prosecution history precluded the patent owner
from recovering under the doctrine of equivalents) would be correct
only if it were clear that this was the intended meaning of the appli-
cant's prosecution argument. However, the Federal Circuit found
other possible interpretations of the applicant's prosecution
argument. 142
Drawing all inferences in favor of the patent owner, 143 the Fed-
eral Circuit found that the inventor may have been suggesting that
the cited reference was not anticipatory because it was not enabling
under 35 USC § 112, since it did not disclose the structure of, or
how to make, HGH.14 Consequently, it could not be said that the
meaning of the inventor's prosecution arguments was without ambi-
guity and that all factual questions regarding the intent of those
arguments had been resolved. The alternative interpretation of the
inventor's prosecution argument was relevant to the proper applica-
tion of prosecution history estoppel as a limitation to infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents. The existence of disputed factual
questions regarding the intent and meaning of the prosecution argu-
ments therefore precluded summary judgment. Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit vacated that part of the judgment which held that
141. Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., supra note 139, at 1565.
142. The patent owner suggested that "because the starting material for producing the
carbamidomethylated derivative [of the invention claimed in the application] was the syn-
thetic hormone of Figure 2 (believed at that time by [the inventor] to be the same structure as
natural HGH), whereas the starting material disclosed by, [the cited reference] was natural
HGH, the patentee surrendered only carbamidomethylated substitutes derived from natural
HGH." Id. at 1566. The Federal Circuit found this alternative interpretation to be "consis-
tent with the view expressed throughout the patent specification that the structure of Figure 2
and natural HGH were one and the same." Id.
143. As required by summary judgment. See, eg., Avia Group Int'l., Inc. v. L.A. Gear
Cal., 853 F.2d 1557, 1560 (9th Cir. 1988).
144. See Akzo N.V. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
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the claims are not infringed under the doctrine of equivalents and
remanded the case to the district court to determine the intent and
effect of the arguments made during prosecution.
C. Infringement Under the Doctrine is Not Precluded by the
Existence of Additional Elements in the Accused
Device
The subject patent in Insta-Foam Products, Inc. v. Universal
Foam Systems, Inc. 145 was directed to a foam mixing and dispensing
gun having a replaceable nozzle. The infringer appealed from a dis-
trict court order holding that the accused foam gun infringed the
patent under the doctrine of equivalents.
On appeal, the infringer argued that the evidence did not sup-
port the district court's finding that the accused gun operated in
substantially the same way as the claimed invention. First, the in-
fringer argued that the structural differences between the accused
gun and the claimed invention -were crucial to the successful opera-
tion of the accused gun, and second, that if the components of the
accused gun were constructed and operated in a manner substan-
tially the same as that recited in the patent claims, then the accused
gun would not be operative for its intended purpose.
The Federal Circuit rejected both of these arguments, noting
that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is not precluded
merely because the accused device is designed to include elements
or perform functions in addition to those included in or performed
by the claimed device. It is the elements and functions of the
claimed invention, not the elements and functions of the accused
device, which establish the reference point for the doctrine of
equivalents analysis. 46 To find infringement under the doctrine, it
is sufficient that the accused device performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the
same result as the claimed invention. 47 The Federal Circuit, there-
fore, found it immaterial that the accused gun additionally had fea-
tures or performed functions that were not included in or
performed by the claimed device. It thus affirmed the district
court's decision that the accused foam gun infringed the patent
under the doctrine of equivalents.
145. 906 F.2d 698 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
146. Pennwalt Corp., supra note 132, at 934.
147. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988).
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D. Summary Judgment of Noninfringement Under the
Doctrine of Equivalents
The district court in Becton Dickinson & Co. v. CR. Bard,
Inc. 4 held that with respect to claim 1 and all claims dependent
thereon, the accused infringer was entitled to summary judgment of
noninfringement.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court regarding
the absence of literal infringement of claim 1, finding that there
could be no dispute that the accused device did not literally include
all of the limitations of claim 1.149 The patent owner argued that
the Teflon coating over the coil spring in the accused device should
be treated as an "additional element beyond those recited in the
claims and thus all limitations of the claim are met." 150 However,
the Federal Circuit found that such a position would require the
Court to disregard specific limitations set forth in the claim. 5'
With respect to the absence of infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents, the district court had found that the accused product
did not perform the work of the patented device "in substantially
the same manner."15' 2 The Federal Circuit noted that to prevail on
this issue, the patent owner bore the burden of proving that the
Teflon coating of the accused device was equivalent to the jacket
structure required by the claim."5 3 The Federal Circuit found that
the patent owner simply failed to recognize and satisfy its burden of
proffering evidence with respect to equivalency.
The Federal Circuit concluded that because there was no genu-
ine issue of material fact as to the absence from the accused device
of at least one structural limitation, both literally and equivalently,
148. 922 F.2d 792 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
149. Claim 1 recited, inter alia, "A flexible guide wire, comprising:... a plastic jacket
... terminating at the coil spring proximal end .... " (emphasis added). The accused device
was covered by a Teflon coating which extends without a break over the core and the coil
spring.
150. Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods. Inc., 731 F.2d 840 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 831 (1984); Uniroyal Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
cerL denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988).
151. In appropriate circumstances, additional features of an accused device can be disre-
garded in an infringement analysis. See A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700
(Fed. Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley, 837
F.2d 1044, 1057.
152. Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1228, 1249 (D. N.J. 1989)
(emphasis in original), aff'd, 922 F.2d 792 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
153. Only if each claim limitation is satisfied, at least equivalently, can it be found that
the two devices work "in substantially the same way." Graver Tank, supra note 134, at 608;
LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm., 867 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1989); Pennwalt Corp., supra note 132, at 934.
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the grant of summary judgment of noninfringement was not in
error.
XII. DEFENSES
A. Laches and Equitable Estoppel
In the case of Meyers v. Brooks Shoe, Inc. 154 the patent owner
had contacted the accused infringer's general counsel by telephone
and notified the general counsel of the alleged infringement in Au-
gust of 1983. In June of 1988 the patent owner filed suit against the
accused infringer, alleging infringment of three different patents.
The accused infringer moved for summary judgment on the de-
fenses of laches and equitable estoppel.1" The district court
granted the accused infringer's motion.
The issue on appeal to the Federal Circuit was whether the
district court had erred in concluding that there was no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the accused infringer was enti-
tled to judgment on the defenses of laches and equitable estoppel as
a matter of law.
The Federal Circuit found that the district court should not
have granted summary judgment on the laches defense because the
accused infringer had not presented undisputed facts showing that
the patent owner's delay in filing suit was unreasonable and that the
accused infringer had been prejudiced by the delay. The Federal
Circuit further concluded that the accused infringer was not enti-
tled to judgment on its defense of equitable estoppel. The court rea-
soned that it had failed to show unreasonable delay and prejudice,
stating that a mere verbal charge of infringement, if made, followed
by silence was not sufficient affirmative conduct to induce a belief
that the patent owner had abandoned an infringement claim.
The Federal Circuit also found that the district court had erred
in basing its decision on a single laches period (running from ap-
154. 912 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
155. The defense of laches bars recovery of damages for any infringement occurring
before suit was filed. The related defense of equitable estoppel bars all relief for patent in-
fringement. To establish laches, the accused infringer must show unreasonable and inexcus-
able delay in filing suit and material prejudice resulting from the delay. Jamesbury Corp. v.
Litton Industrial Products, Inc., 839 F.2d 1544, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
828 (1988); Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d 1570, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Laches is
presumed in patent infringement cases if the delay in bringing suit is longer than six years.
Otherwise, the accused infringer has the burden of proving both elements of the defense. To
establish equitable estoppel, the accused infringer must show both elements of laches as well
as affirmative conduct by the patent owner inducing the belief that the patent owner had
abandoned the claims against the accused infringer and detrimental reliance by the accused
infringer. Jamesbury, 839 F.2d at 1553; Hottel, 833 F.2d at 1573.
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proximately 1983 to June of 1988) for all three patents. The patent
owner could not have filed suit on the second patent until after it
issued in May 1984, and could not have filed suit on the third patent
until after it issued in December 1986. Therefore, the delay was at
most 5 years for the first issued patent, but only 4 years for the
second issued patent and 1 years for the third issued patent. Be-
cause each of these periods of delay was less than six years, the
accused infringer had the burden of proving that each was unrea-
sonable and that it was materially prejudiced by such delay.
The second patent at issue was a divisional of the first. When
the patent owner learned of the alleged infringement, the second
patent application was already pending. The Federal Circuit noted
that waiting for issuance of the second patent to sue on both at the
same time conserved both the parties' and the courts' resources.
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that it was reasonable for
the patent owner to have waited to sue on the first patent, at least
until the patent owner could sue on both the first and second pat-
ents at the same time.1 56
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment of the
district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The issue presented to the Federal Circuit in Adelberg Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Miles, Inc. 157 was whether the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of the accused infringer by
finding that no genuine issue of material fact was raised with respect
to the accused infringer's defenses of laches and estoppel.
In 1973, the patent owner granted an exclusive license, includ-
ing the right to grant sublicenses. The patent owner became aware
of allegedly infringing activity as early as 1977. In 1978, the exclu-
sive licensee informed the patent owner that if the accused infringer
did infringe the patent, then the infringer would have a right to the
technology on the basis of a prior technology agreement. 158 The
exclusive license was converted to a nonexclusive license in late
1985. In 1988, ten years after the last contact between the licensee
and the alleged infringer, the patent owner filed suit against the al-
leged infringer for patent infringment.
156. There may be times when a patentee must bring suit before the expected issuance of
the second of two related patents. See, eg., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. Miller Formless Co., 693
F.2d 697, 699 n.4 (7th Cir. 1982).
157. 921 F.2d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
158. In 1971, the accused infringer had entered into a technology agreement with the
exclusive licensee which gave the accused infringer rights to any future technology acquired
by the exclusive licensee, including the patent at issue. The contents of the technology agree-
ment were never revealed to the patent owner.
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The Federal Circuit noted that there was no dispute that the
delay by the patent owner exceeded six years, thus presumptively
establishing laches. As the accused infringer had extensive sales
during the period of delay, the Federal Circuit noted there was no
dispute that the accused infringer was actually prejudiced by the
delay.
The Federal Circuit found that on these facts, the district court
had not abused its discretion in allowing the defense of laches.1 59
The patent owner attempted to justify its delay on the basis of the
technology agreement between the accused infringer and the third
party.160 The Federal Circuit did not find the argument persuasive,
noting that a potential legal impediment to an infringement action,
such as the defense of having a sublicense, is an unpersuasive excuse
for failing to pursue an infringement action.
Although laches serves to bar only retrospective relief, the de-
fense of estoppel totally bars any assertion of the patent claim. 161
The Federal Circuit took note of the district court findings that
there was no genuine issue concerning the unreasonable delay in
bringing suit and the resulting prejudice. There was also no genuine
issue regarding the patent owner's inducement of the accused in-
fringer to believe that it had abandoned its claim of infringement,
thus satisfying the "affirmative conduct" element of the estoppel de-
fense, 16' and that the accused infringer detrimentally relied on the
patent owner's conduct.
The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not err in
concluding, on summary judgment, that the patent owner should be
estopped from pursuing its claim for patent infringement.
B. Assignor Estoppel
The doctrine of assignor estoppel precludes a patent assignor,
159. The application of the defense of laches is within the discretion of the trial court and
will not be set aside absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Jamesbury, supra note 155, at
1551.
160. The patent owner asserted that if it had sued knowing that the accused infringer
had a license under the patent, it could have been sanctioned under FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
161. Hottel Corp., supra note 155, at 1573.
162. The affirmative conduct that estoppel requires includes misrepresentations, affirma-
tive acts of misconduct, or intentionally misleading silence by the patentee, Broomall Indus.
v. Data Design Logic Systems, Inc., 786 F.2d 401, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Federal Circuit
indicated that the third party, at the patent owner's insistence, had asserted infringment
against the accused infringer in 1977 and then waited until 1988 to sue. The court found the
long period of silence by the patent owner after first affirmatively asserting patent infringe-
ment sufficed to support the conclusion that the patent owner reasonably induced the accused
infringer to believe it had abandoned its claim. See Hottel Corp., supra note 155, at 1574.
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as well as those in privity with the assignor, from contending that
the patent is a nullity.163 Privity with the assignor is determined
upon a balance of the equities. For example, if an inventor assigns
an invention to an employer company A and then leaves to join a
company B, whether company B is in privity with the inventor (and
thus bound by the doctrine of assignor estoppel) will depend upon
the equities dictated by the relationship between the inventor and
company B in light of the act of infringement. The closer the rela-
tionship between the inventor and company B, the more equity will
favor applying the doctrine of assignor estoppel to company B.164
In the case of Shamrock Technologies, Inc. v. Medical Steriliza-
tion, Inc. 165 the doctrine of assignor estoppel was applied to bar a
counterclaim of patent invalidity. The inventor in Shamrock was
employed by the patent owner company between May 1980 and
July 1983. As a condition of employment, the inventor agreed to
assign his work-related inventions to the company. During his em-
ployment, the inventor invented a method and apparatus for
processing polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) with radiation. In
March 1982 the inventor assigned his rights in the invention to the
company. A patent application for the invention was filed shortly
thereafter. The inventor left the company in July 1983 and joined
the infringer company as vice president in charge of operations.
Thereafter, the infringing company began radiation processing of
PTFE.
The patent owner sued both the infringing company and the
inventor for patent infringement. The infringing company and the
inventor counterclaimed for a declaration of patent invalidity. The
district court entered summary judgment, holding that the accused
process infringed the patent and that the affirmative defenses and
counterclaim relating to patent invalidity were barred by assignor
estoppel. The infringer company and the inventor appealed from
the summary judgment, asserting that the district court erred in
holding that assignor estoppel precluded the invalidity and unen-
forceability defenses.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered the balance of equi-
163. Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
dismissed, 487 U.S. 1265 (1988).
164. See, e.g., Douglass v. United States Appliance Corp., 177 F.2d 98, 101 (9th Cir.
1949); United States Appliance Corp. v. Beauty Shop Supply Co., 121 F.2d 149, 151 (9th Cir.
1991), cer denied, 314 U.S. 680 (1941); Stubnitz-Greene Spring Corp. v. Fort Pitt Bedding
Co., 110 F.2d 192, 195 (6th Cir. 1940); Buckingham Prod. Co. v. McAleer Mfg. Co., 108
F.2d 192, 195 (6th Cir. 1939); Frick Co. v. Lindsay, 27 F.2d 59, 61 (4th Cir. 1928).
165. 903 F.2d 789 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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ties and the relationship of the inventor and the infringing company
and agreed with the district court that no genuine issue of material
fact existed regarding privity between the inventor and the infring-
ing company. 166 The Federal Circuit further found that the mere
classification of some of the defenses raised by the infringing com-
pany and inventor as equitable in nature (i.e., inequitable conduct)
did not bar application of the doctrine of assignor estoppel. If that
were possible, the doctrine of assignor estoppel could be avoided
merely by couching invalidity defenses in terms of inequitable con-
duct. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the district court's en-
try of summary judgment.
C. Noninfringing Use
In determining liability under 35 USC § 271(b) and (c) of a
seller of a device capable of infringing a patented process, it is neces-
sary to determine whether the accused device also has non-infring-
ing uses, or whether the accused device can only be used in the
practice of the patented process.1 67
The issue of whether the accused device had such non-infring-
ing uses was presented in the case of CR. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. 168 The subject patent in CR. Bard
was directed to a method of using a catheter in coronary angi-
oplasty. The accused infringer marketed the only perfusion cathe-
ter approved by the FDA for use in coronary angioplasty. The
district court had granted summary judgment in favor of the patent
owner, finding that the accused infringer had actively induced or
contributed to infringement of the patent.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that, for purposes of this
case, to find contributory infringement the accused infringer must
sell a catheter for use in practicing the claimed process and for
which such use constitutes a material part of the invention, with the
166. In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit noted that the following facts were
undisputed: (1) in July 1983 the inventor left the patent owner company to join the infringer
company as vice-president in charge of operations; (2) the inventor owned 50,000 shares of
stock in the infringer company; (3) the infringer company was formed in 1982 to sterilize
surgical instruments and manufacture other medical goods, yet as soon as the inventor was
hired in 1983, the infringer company built facilities for processing PTFE with radiation; (4)
the inventor oversaw the design and construction of those facilities; (5) the inventor was hired
in part to start up the infringer company's infringing operations; (6) the decision to begin
processing PTFE with radiation was made jointly by the inventor and the president of the
infringer company; (7) the infringer company began manufacturing PTFE with radiation in
1985; and (8) the inventor was in charge of the infringer company's PTFE operation.
167. Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 199 (1980).
168. 911 F.2d 670 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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accused infringer knowing that the catheter was especially made or
adapted for use in infringing the patent, and the catheter must not
be a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substan-
tial noninfringing use. The Federal Circuit found that there was
uncontested evidence in the record that the accused device could be
used in processes which did not infringe the subject patent. View-
ing this evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
and resolving all reasonable inferences in the accused infringer's
favor, the Federal Circuit concluded that it could not be said that
the patent owner was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded.
XIII. INJUNCTIONS - 35 USC § 283
A. Injunctive Relief and 35 USC § 271(e)(1)
After a jury trial in the case of Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic,
Inc.,169 the accused infringer was found liable for the manufacture,
use and sale of infringing medical devices known as pacemaker
cardioverter defibrillators. The district court had concluded that
the exemption from infringement provided by 35 USC § 271(e)(1)
was not available for medical devices, and had therefore precluded
consideration of that issue at trial. A permanent injunction was
issued.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the district court had
erred in concluding that the exemption from infringement provided
by 35 USC § 271(e)(1) was not available for such devices.170 The
Federal Circuit remanded for trial to determine whether the ac-
cused infringer's activities in fact fell within the statutory
exemption.
Upon remand, the accused infringer asked for the injunction to
be vacated, modified or stayed and for a new trial. Without any
additional proceedings on the merits of the § 271(e)(1) issue, the
district court modified the injunction to exclude activities falling
under § 271(e)(1), but otherwise left the injunction intact. Subse-
quently, the patent owner moved to hold the accused infringer in
contempt for violation of the modified injunction. The district
court found that the accused infringer had violated the terms of the
modified injunction and issued a contempt order.1 7 ' The accused
169. 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1760 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
170. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct.
2683 (1990).
171. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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infringer appealed the district court's contempt order to the Federal
Circuit.
The Federal Circuit first concluded that the district court's
findings were insufficient to establish a violation of the modified in-
junction. 72 The injunction prohibited activities that infringed the
subject patents, either directly, contributorily or by inducement.
The activities cited by the district court included lectures given by
the accused infringer during which the accused devices were dis-
cussed and the publication of an Annual Report that contained a
two-page section showing a photograph of the accused devices.
The Federal Circuit found that the cited activities were not
themselves acts of infringement, and that there was no evidence that
the accused infringer contemplated any sales of the accused devices
until after the expiration of the subject patents. The Federal Circuit
accordingly concluded that, absent a finding of infringement, no
contempt could be found.
The Federal Circuit further concluded that the modified in-
junction itself must be vacated. 173 In its prior judgment, the Fed-
eral Circuit had held that the accused infringer had been deprived
of the opportunity to prove a valid exemption to infringement under
§ 271(e)(1). The case had been remanded for trial on that issue.
However, on remand, the district court had not vacated any part of
the judgment. Instead, the district court had merely modified the
injunction so as to exclude § 271(e)(1) activities. According to the
Federal Circuit, that action was not sufficient to correct the defect
in the judgment itself. The mandate of the Federal Circuit required
the prior judgment to be vacated.
In addition, the Federal Circuit found that the original injunc-
tion had been based on a defective infringement judgment and,
therefore, must also be vacated. Section 271(e)(3) of the statute spe-
cifically provides that no injunction may issue until the § 271(e)(1)
exemption has been adjudicated and ruled out. A proper judgment
of infringement requires consideration of, and an adverse ruling on,
the § 271(e)(1) issue. Accordingly, the district court should not
have merely modified the original injunction to exclude § 271(e)(1)
activities, but should have vacated the injunction. The court stated
that the language of the statute clearly required the district court to
decide the § 271(e)(1) issue prior to the grant of injunctive relief.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's
order holding the accused infringer in contempt, vacated the prior




judgment of infringement, and all injunctive orders based on that
judgment. Further, the Federal Circuit declared that no permanent
injunction could be granted unless and until a judgment of infringe-
ment was entered following consideration of the asserted exemption
to infringement under § 271(e)(1).
B. Preliminary Injunction
In the case of Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of
Ohio, Inc. 174 the patent owner sought a preliminary injunction to
halt the manufacture and sale of allegedly infringing replacement
parts for the patent owner's trucks.
In reviewing the district court's denial of the patent owner's
motion,17 1 the Federal Circuit applied the well-known four-factor
analysis to determine if the patent owner had established a right to a
preliminary injunction. 176 The Court treated the application of the
factors as a procedural issue, noting that for substantive matters not
exclusively assigned to the Federal Circuit, the Court's general
practice is to apply the appropriate regional circuit law to the re-
lated procedural issues. 177 However, the Court noted that when the
question on appeal involves substantive matters unique to the Fed-
eral Circuit, as in Chrysler Motors Corp., the Court applies the law
of the Federal Circuit to the related procedural issues.1 78
The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in holding that the patent owner had not met the rea-
sonable likelihood of success or irreparable harm prongs of the pre-
liminary injunction test. 179  Without the requisite showing of
validity, the patent owner was not entitled to any presumption re-
garding harm.
C. Requirement of Irreparable Harm
The Federal Circuit has previously noted that the patent sys-
174. 908 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (hereinafter "Chrysler Motors Corp").
175. Chrysler Motors Corp., 719 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
176. Citing to T.J. Smith & Nephew Ltd. v. Consolidated Medical Equip., Inc., 821 F.2d
646, 647, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1316, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Chrysler Motors Corp., supra
note 174, at 952 applied four factors: 1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; 2)
irreparable harm; 3) the balance of hardships tipping in favor of the requesting party; and 4)
that the issuance of an injunction is in the public interest.
177. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
178. Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
179. The trial judge's determination will be reviewed by the Federal Circuit solely to
ascertain if there was an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or a serious misjudgment of the
evidence. T.J. Smith & Nephew Ltd. v. Consolidated Medical Equip., Inc., 821 F.2d at 647.
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tern is disserved by the concept that no patentee could ever be irrep-
arably harmed by an alleged infringer's pretrial sales so long as an
alleged infringer is capable of responding in damages. 180 In the case
of Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc."' the Federal Circuit
recognized that the patent system is equally disserved by the con-
cept that every patentee is always irreparably harmed by an alleged
infringer's pretrial sales.
Before the district court, the patent owner in Illinois Tool
Works had moved for a preliminary injunction against the accused
infringer. 82 The district court found that a market value for the
invention could be established by looking to an existing license for
the patent in suit. The district court also found no showing that the
accused infringer could not pay damages assessed against it for in-
fringement. The district court concluded that monetary damages
would sufficiently compensate the patent owner for alleged infringe-
ment occurring during the course of the litigation and consequently
denied the patent owner's motion for preliminary injunction.
The issue on appeal was whether the district court had abused
its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the patent owner argued that irreparable harm had
been demonstrated by evidence of the patent owner's potential lost
sales. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that
acceptance of such a position would require a finding of irreparable
harm to every manufacturer/patentee, regardless of circumstances.
The patent owner also argued that the presence of a patent license
should not be construed as evidence of the absence of irreparable
harm. However, the Federal Circuit found nothing in the record to
indicate how the "lost sales" attributable to the accused infringer
would be any less compensable in dollars than the "lost sales" at-
tributable to the patent licensee. The Federal Circuit, therefore, af-
firmed the district court's denial of the patent owner's motion for
preliminary injunction.
D. Modification of Injunctive Order
The patent owner in the case of Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr
v. Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft 18 had
filed suit for infringement in 1983. After a trial, the district court
held that the infringers had willfully infringed the subject patent.
180. See Roper Corp. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 757 F.2d 1266, 1269 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
181. 906 F.2d 679 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
182. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. II1. 1989).
183. 903 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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The district court issued an injunctive order which prohibited sales
in the U.S. of the infringing machine, any colorable imitation
thereof, or any other apparatus covered by the claims of the subject
patent.
Subsequently, the infringers were found to be in contempt of
the injunction. At the second contempt proceeding, the district
court held that because of the infringers' "flagrant contemptuous
conduct" it was necessary to impose additional injunctive relief in
order to secure future compliance with the district court's orders.184
The district court therefore issued a substantially broadened injunc-
tive order.18 5
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the infringers' re-
peated violations of the earlier injunctive order provided ample ba-
sis for concluding that the more traditional and narrower forms of
relief imposed in the first order were not adequate and justified the
broader provisions of the later injunctive order. Thus, broadening
the injunction to cover "any automated rotor spinning machine,"
without the qualifying word "infringing," was not an abuse of dis-
cretion. 186 Similarly, in view of the infringers' sale of machines with
minor modifications that did not avoid infringement, it was not un-
reasonable for the district court to require the infringers to first ob-
184. Id. at 1574.
185. The broadened injunctive order prohibited the infringers from "directly or indi-
rectly engaging in any activity which in any way relates to the manufacture, sale, use, serv-
icing, exhibition, demonstration, promotion or commercialization of any automated rotor
spinning machines, either in the U.S. or for use in the U.S." The order also required that the
infringers "immediately cancel all pending orders in their possession for automated rotor
spinning machines destined for delivery to the U.S." and "prominently include.., in all
advertising materials, promotional literature, brochures, press releases and the like which
relate in any way to any automated rotor spinning machines manufactured by or with the
assistance or participation of defendants, or either of them" a notice that the machine was
"not available for sale or use in, or delivery to the U.S." The order further provided that if, in
the future, the infringers "so substantially redesign an automated open-end spinning machine
in such a way that they have a good faith belief that they can clearly and convincingly show
that the changes therein are so significant that such redesigned machine does not infringe any
of the adjudged infringed U.S. patents," the infringers, "prior to engaging in any activity
enjoined by this Court's orders, [shall] make application in verified form to this Court for
relief from the [pertinent] provisions of [the decree]. In any such application for relief, de-
fendants shall set forth full details of their redesigned machine and shall verify that they have
made such machine together with relevant technical documentation fully available to plain-
tiffs at a convenient location outside the U.S. for their inspection, testing and comment to this
Court prior to any ruling by the Court on the application for relief." Further, the district
court required that the chief executive officer of the infringer file with the district court quar-
terly sworn statements "certifying that, based upon his individual inspection of all relevant
information available to the defendants, all Orders entered in this action have been fully
complied with." Id. at 1574-75.
186. Id. at 1577.
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tain the district court's permission before attempting sales of other
modified machines.
The infringers argued that the second injunction impermissibly
extended the reach of U.S. patent law beyond the boundaries of the
U.S. by applying its prohibitions to machines manufactured in Ger-
many. The Federal Circuit noted, however, that the requirements
of the injunction applied only to machines "in the U.S. or for use il
the, U.S." or which are "destined for delivery to the U.S."' 87 The
Federal Circuit found these provisions were a reasonable and per-
missible method of preventing infringement in the U.S., were within
the district court's authority, and were not a prohibited extra-terri-
torial application of U.S. patent law.
E. Presumption of Irreparable Harm Under 19 USC § 1337
May be Rebutted by Evidence of Likely Actual Harm
In the case of Rosemount, Inc. v. U.S. International Trade
Commission,'88 the patent owner moved for temporary relief in a
proceeding before the ITC under 19 USC § 1337. The Commission
found that the presumption of irreparable harm to which the patent
owner was entitled was rebutted by the evidence.1 89 The Commis-
sion, therefore, denied the patent owner's motion for temporary re-
lief, and the patent owner appealed from the Commission's order
denying relief.'9°
The principal issue on appeal was whether the Commission
had committed an error of law in determining that the presumption
of irreparable harm, which was afforded to the patent owner by its
strong showing of success on the merits, 19' was rebuttable by evi-
dence of the patent owner's likely actual damages.
The Federal Circuit observed that, like any other presumption
of fact, a presumption of irreparable harm to a patent owner cannot
187. Id. at 1577-78.
188. 910 F.2d 819 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
189. Included was evidence establishing: 1) the patent owner's delay in bringing suit; 2)
the patent owner's grant of two licenses; 3) the patent owner's large market share as com-
pared to the "minuscule" share of the accused infringer; 4) the presence of twelve major
noninfringing competitors in the U.S. market; 5) the availability of a damage remedy in dis-
trict court; 6) the growth in U.S. market share experienced by the patent owner for the two
previous fiscal years; 7) the growth in U.S. market share anticipated by the patent owner for
the next four to five years; and 8) the improbability that the accused infringer's very small
U.S. market share would increase during the pendency of the investigation.
190. In re Certain Pressure Transmitters, Inv. No. 337-TA-304, 1991 ITC LEXIS 833
(March 19, 1990).
191. See Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983).
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override the evidence of record. 192
The Federal Circuit further rejected the patent owner's argu-
ment that a presumption of irreparable harm can be overcome only
by evidence that the accused infringer had stopped importation of
the allegedly infringing products. Consequently, it was proper for
the Commission to take into consideration all of the evidence relat-
ing to the patent owner's actual harm.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the Commission's denial of
temporary relief was based on a correct interpretation of the law, on
findings supported by substantial evidence, and was reasonable on
the facts of the case. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the
Commissioner's denial of temporary relief.
F. A Respondent's Secondary Products May be Included
Within the Scope of Exclusion Orders Under 19 USC
§ 1337
The respondent in Hyundai Electronics Industries Co., Ltd. v.
U.S. International Trade Commission1 93  produced Erasable
Programmable Read Only Memories (EPROMs) for a third party.
The third party routinely took possession of the EPROMs in Korea,
shipped them to Taiwan for further processing, and subsequently
imported some portion of the EPROMs into the U.S. The respon-
dent did not use the accused EPROMs in its own products, and did
not import the accused EPROMs, in any form, into the U.S.
The accused EPROMs were found to infringe valid U.S. pat-
ents. The Commission, therefore, issued an order prohibiting the
respondent from importing the infringing EPROMS into the U.S.,
and also requiring the respondent to certify, as a condition of entry,
that certain of its "secondary" products' 94 did not contain the in-
fringing EPROMs. 195 There was no evidence of the number and
type of EPROMs contained in the secondary products sought to be
excluded. Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that these sec-
ondary products could be included within the scope of the protec-
tive order without requiring a showing that the secondary products
caused injury to the domestic EPROM industry.
192. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., supra note 176, at 683-84; Panduit
Corp. v. All States Plastics Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
193. 899 F.2d 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
194. Le., computers, computer peripherals, telecommunications equipment, and automo-
tive electronic equipment.
195. Hyundai, supra note 193, at 1205 (citing to Certain Erasable Programmable Read
Only Memories, Components Thereof Products Containing Such Memories, and Processes for
Making Such Memories, Inv. No. 337-TA-276, 1989 ITC LEXIS 122 (May 1989)).
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The principal issue presented on appeal was whether the Com-
mission properly included the respondent's secondary products
within the scope of the exclusion order.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the appropriate standard
of review was whether the Commission's choice of remedy was arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law. 196 The Federal Circuit found that the Commission's
remedy in Hyundai readily met the abuse of discretion standard,
and that the Commission's limited exclusion order requiring the re-
spondent to certify, as a condition of entry, that certain of its secon-
dary products do not contain infringing EPROMs, was reasonable.
The decision and exclusion order of the Commission was thus
affirmed.
G. 19 USC § 337(a) Does Not Prohibit Imports Made by an
Unpatented Process Using a Patented Article
The subject patent in the case of Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission 197 contained article claims directed to re-
combinant DNA sequences, vectors and host cells used to produce
recombinant erythropoietin (rEPO). 198 The patent did not contain
any process claim, nor did the patent contain any article claim di-
rected to rEPO itself.199
In a complaint filed with the Commission, the patent owner
alleged that the accused infringer had violated 19 USC § 1337 and
§ 1337(a) by importing rEPO made by a process "covered" by the
subject patent. The patent owner's theory of liability was that the
accused infringer's process for making rEPO used the articles
claimed in the patent. More specifically, if the accused infringer's
process for making EPO was performed in the U.S., then the pro-
cess would infringe the patent because the process would use the
claimed articles, and the use of the claimed articles would be an
infringement of the article claims. Therefore, the patent owner ar-
196. Id. at 1207-08 (The respondent had argued that the appropriate standard of review
was that of "substantial evidence," requires the Federal Circuit to set aside a Commission
remedy determination if that determination is not supported by substantial evidence. (citation
omitted) The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, finding that the substantial evidence
standard of review is applied only to Commission factual findings underlying determinations
to exclude goods from entry under Subsections 337(d) and (e)).
197. 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
198. Erythropoietin is a hormone which controls the synthesis of red blood cells in bone
marrow and which is useful for treating patients suffering from anemia.
199. The application which matured into the '008 patent originally contained claims to
the process of producing rEPO. The process claims were canceled prior to issuance of the
'008 patent. Amgen, supra note 197, at 1534 n.1.
[Vol. 8
PATENT LAW DEVEL OPMENTS
gued, the article claims of the patent "covered" the process for
making rEPO, and the importation of goods made by that process
was within the terms of § 337.2'
The administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that the Com-
mission had subject matter jurisdiction over the patent owner's
complaint, but the claims of the patent did not cover the accused
process for making rEPO. The ALJ therefore concluded that no
violation of § 337(a)(1)(B)(ii) had occurred.20 1
The Commission disagreed with the ALJ on the jurisdictional
issue. The Commission concluded that an investigation under
§ 337(a)(1)(B)(ii) required, as a jurisdictional prerequisite, the pres-
ence of at least one process claim in the patent. Since the subject
patent did not contain any process claim, the Commission con-
cluded that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, rather than on the merits, and entered an order
terminating the investigation.2 "2 The patent owner appealed from
the Commission order dismissing the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Both the Commission and the accused infringer
filed motions to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the Federal
Circuit was without jurisdiction to review the Commission's order,
since that order constituted a dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and was not a final determination on the merits.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first considered the threshold
jurisdictional issue. The Federal Circuit's authority to review a de-
cision of the Commission is limited by § 337(c), which requires a
"final determination decision on the merits, excluding or refusing to
exclude articles from 'entry'" under § 337(d), (e), (f) or (g)203
However, the mere fact that the Commission labeled its dismissal as
one for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than as a final
determination on the merits, was not dispositive of the jurisdictional
issue. The Federal Circuit stated that it will recognize as appealable
under § 337(c) any decision that is "intrinsically" a final determina-
tion on the merits. 2 4
In determining whether a Commission order is intrinsically a
final determination, the presence or absence of findings by the Com-
mission is critical. In Amgen, the Commission found that the
200. Id. at 1534.
201. Id. at 1534-35.
202. In re Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1906 (1989).
203. Block v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis
in original).
204. Ida; Import Motors Ltd. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 530 F.2d 940, 944 (C.C.P.A.
1976).
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claims of the subject patent did not cover a process. The Federal
Circuit viewed this finding as clearly reaching the merits of the pat-
ent owner's complaint and being determinative of the patent
owner's right to proceed in a § 337 action. Thus, although not
identified as such, the Commission's dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction was "intrinsically" a final decision on the merits.
The Federal Circuit consequently held that it had jurisdiction to
review the Commission's order, and proceeded to deny the Com-
mission's, and the accused infringer's, motion to dismiss the appeal.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the Commission should
have treated the patent owner's complaint on the merits, not on
jurisdictional grounds. The complaint alleged that the accused in-
fringer was importing rEPO, and that the rEPO was made by a
process covered by the subject patent. The complaint therefore, on
its face, came within the jurisdiction of the Commission. That the
patent owner was later unable to sustain these allegations was not
material to the issue of jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit held that
the Commission should have assumed jurisdiction, and, if the facts
indicated that the patent owner could not obtain relief under
§ 337(a)(1)(B)(ii), then the Commission should have dismissed on
the merits.
The Federal Circuit then addressed the issue of whether
§ 337(a)(1)(B)(ii) was intended to prohibit the importation of arti-
cles made abroad by a process in which a product claimed in a U.S.
patent is used. The Federal Circuit found that § 337(a) was enacted
to prohibit imports made by using a process protected by a U.S.
patent, and not to prohibit imports made by a process using an arti-
cle protected by a U.S. patent.2 °5 Since none of the claims of the
subject patent covered the process performed overseas by the ac-
cused infringer, the Federal Circuit concluded that the patent
owner's complaint under § 337(a)(1)(B)(ii) must be dismissed.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit vacated the Commission's Order,
and remanded for entry of a final determination dismissing the com-
plaint on the merits.
H. Injunctive Relief Involving Both Patent and Antitrust
Issues
When a patented product is so successful that it creates its own
economic market or consumes a large section of an existing market,
a fine line may exist between actions that protect the legitimate in-
205. Amgen, supra note 197, at 1539.
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terests of the patent owner and actions that violate the antitrust
laws. On the one hand, the patent owner must be allowed to pro-
tect the property right given to it under the patent laws. On the
other hand, the patent owner may not take the property right
granted by a patent and use it to improperly extend its power in the
marketplace beyond the limits of the patent laws. The danger of
disturbing the complementary balance between patent and antitrust
rights is particularly great when a court is asked to preliminarily
enjoin conduct affecting both such rights.
The issue of a preliminary injunction involving both patent and
antitrust rights was presented in the case of Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of America, Inc.2" 6 The patent owner (Nintendo) was the
industry leader in home video game equipment, occupying an 80%
share of the market.2"7 The subject patent was directed to a secur-
ity system necessary for a game cartridge to be played on the
Nintendo Entertainment System (NES).
The accused infringer, without license from the patent owner,
manufactured and sold its own Nintendo compatible cartridges
which were able to circumvent the NES security system. The ac-
cused infringer asserted that the patent owner had sent letters to
retailers threatening suit for infringement against any retailer who
sold unauthorized NES compatible game cartridges. The accused
infringer filed suit against the patent owner for unfair competition
and antitrust violations, asserting that the patent owner was im-
properly using its patent and greater market share to monopolize
the home video game market. The patent owner then filed suit
against the accused infringer, alleging (among other things) patent
infringement.
The suits were consolidated. The accused infringer sought a
preliminary injunction to prevent the patent owner from suing re-
tailers of the accused NES compatible cartridges. 'The district court
granted the preliminary injunction. However, the district court
went further and also enjoined the accused infringer from filing suit
against the patent owner's customers. Both parties appealed the de-
cision to the Federal Circuit.
Applying the law of the Ninth Circuit, the Federal Circuit
found no sufficient factual basis to support the findings necessary to
grant a preliminary injunction. The district court had based its
grant of the preliminary injunction on a finding that "serious ques-
tions" existed and the balance of harms tipped sharply in favor of
206. 897 F.2d 1572.
207. Id. at 1574.
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the accused infringer. In determining the existence of "serious
questions", however, the district court relied solely upon allegations
made by the accused infringer. The district court made no findings
of fact, except for a finding that the accused infringer's allegations
"are supported by the documents submitted, and are not substan-
tially disputed" by the patent owner.2 08 The district court had not
made a finding that the accused infringer could probably prove its
allegations.
Under certain circumstances, a preliminary injunction may is-
sue on the basis of affidavits alone." However, because of the com-
peting patent and antitrust interests presented in Atari, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the district court's reliance solely upon the
accused infringer's allegations and supporting affidavits was an
abuse of discretion. The Federal Circuit therefore vacated the pre-
liminary injunction and remanded the action to the district court.
XIV. DAMAGES - 35 USC § 284
A. Calculating Lost Profits
After a trial on damages, the district court in the case of Bea-
trice Foods Co. v. New England Printing and Lithographing Co.210
held that the appropriate measure of damages was the patent
owner's lost profits due to the infringer's infringing activity. 211 The
district court measured the damages by the amount of the in-
fringer's sales. The district court then used the infringer's sales as
the measure of the patent owner's lost profits, stating that since the
infringing sales were illicit, the infringer was not entitled to any de-
duction. The district court awarded the patent owner damages for
infringement in the amount of $22,107,837. The infringer appealed
the damage award.
On appeal, the infringer argued that the dollar figure chosen by
the district court was clearly erroneous. The Federal Circuit con-
cluded, however, that the infringer was unable to show better sup-
port for any other dollar figure.21 2 The Federal Circuit therefore
208. Id at 1575.
209. International Molders' & Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799 F.2d
547 (9th Cir. 1986).
210. 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 982 (D. Conn. 1984).
211. The Federal Circuit affirmed in the liability phase of this same case, 758 F.2d 668
(Fed. Cir. 1984), the district court's judgment of infringement found in Beatrice Foods Co. v.
New England Printing and Lithographing Co., 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 982 (D. Conn. 1984).
212. Lindemann Machinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 895 F.2d
1403, 1406-08 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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affirmed the district court's selection of $22,107,837 as the dollar
amount of the infringer's infringing sales.
However, the Federal Circuit did not agree that the district
court had the equitable discretion to simply equate the infringer's
sales with the patent owner's lost profit damages. The district
court's stated reason for doing so (that the infringer, as a tortfeasor,
had no manufacturing costs) did not, in the opinion of the Federal
Circuit, implement the standard of the patent owner's lost profits
required by 35 USC § 284. The Federal Circuit therefore vacated
the judgment that damages were equal to $22,107,837, and re-
manded to the district court for the purpose of determining the
damages on the basis of the patent owner's lost profits.213
B. Addition of a Sole Licensee Corporation as a Party for
the Purpose of Measuring Damages
In the case of Kalman v. Berlyn Corp.214 the patentee and a
partner had formed a corporation that manufactured and marketed
the patented device. The patentee and his partner each owned 50%
of the corporation's stock, and were its sole directors.
After a decision in a trial for infringement liability, the district
court conducted a trial to determine the amount of damages to
which the patentee was entitled.215 In an effort to obtain the full
amount of the corporation's lost profits as damages, the patentee, in
his post-trial brief, moved pursuant to Rules 15 and 21 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure to amend the pleadings to add the
corporation as a plaintiff.216
The district court denied the patentee's motion. Stating that
there was an important legal question as to whether the corporation
was an exclusive licensee for the manufacture of the patented de-
vice,217 the district court concluded that the infringer should have
been afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery regarding the
213. In so doing, the Federal Circuit noted that the district court may, in its equitable
discretion, grant the patent owner's request that its actual damages be multiplied, as author-
ized by 35 USC § 284, even if such an award exceeds $22,107,837. Beatrice Foods Co. v. New
England Printing and Lithographing Co., supra note 210, at 1176.
214. 914 F.2d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
215. See Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191, 1192 (D. Mass. 1988)
(Kalman VI) (the damages trial).
216. "Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that '[p]arties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any
stage of the action and on such terms as are just.' FED. R. Civ. P. 21. Rule 15(a) provides
that a party may amend its pleadings by leave of court, 'and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires.' FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)." Kalman, 914 F.2d at 1479.
217. Generally, a non-exclusive patent licensee has no standing to sue for infringement.
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existence and terms of a licensing agreement between the corpora-
tion and the patentee. The district court therefore limited the pat-
entee's damages to his entitlement to the corporation's profits as a
50% shareholder in the corporation. The patentee appealed.
The Federal Circuit found that the record demonstrated that
the infringer had considered the patentee and the corporation to be
a single entity for purposes of damages, and that the infringer had
not been harmed by a lack of discovery of the corporation's business
practices. The Federal Circuit also concluded that the corporation
had legal standing to join as a co-plaintiff in the suit for damages.
The record demonstrated that the sole licensee corporation had
been directly damaged by the infringer in a two-supplier market,
that the "nexus" between the sole licensee corporation and the pat-
entee was clearly defined, and that the infringer had reason to know
of the corporation's interest and standing. Under these circum-
stances, the Federal Circuit found that the sole licensee corporation
must be recognized as the real party in interest with standing to sue.
The Federal Circuit concluded that, in denying the patentee's
motion to amend his complaint to add the corporation as a plaintiff,
the district court's abuse of discretion resulted in a clear error of
judgment. The Federal Circuit consequently held that the com-
plaint may be amended to add the corporation as a plaintiff.
C. Willful Infringement
The district court found in Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems In-
dustrial Products, Inc.218 that the infringer had been aware of the
subject patents only as of the date on which suit was filed. The
district court concluded, however, that the infringement had been
willful because the infringer had "taken no action" to ascertain
whether the products it was producing would infringe. The district
court denied an award of damages, but awarded the patent owner
attorney fees based solely on the finding of willful infringement.
The infringer appealed from the award of attorney fees.
The issue on appeal was whether the district court clearly erred
in finding the infringement willful.
In deciding this issue, the Federal Circuit observed that the
question of whether infringement is "willful" is a question of the
infringer's intent. That intent must be inferred from all of the cir-
However, an exclusive licensee may have standing to join as a co-plaintiff in a patent infringe-
ment action. See Kalman, 914 F.2d at 1481.
218. 897 F.2d 508 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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cumstances.21 9 If an infringer has no knowledge of a patent, then
the patent infringement cannot be "willful. 220
The Federal Circuit noted that there is no universal rule that
avoidance of willfulness requires an accused infringer to cease man-
ufacture of a product immediately upon learning of a patent, or
upon receipt of a patentee's charge of infringement, or upon the
filing of suit.221 If an accused infringer exercises "due care", it may
continue to manufacture and may present what it believes, in good
faith, to be a legitimate defense without risk of being found, on that
basis alone, to be a willful infringer.222 Willful infringement is not
established if such a good faith defense later proves unsuccessful.
Conversely, an infringer's presentation in bad faith of a totally un-
supportable, frivolous defense may, in itself, provide a basis for at-
torney fees under 35 USC § 285. It may also, in light of all the
circumstances, constitute some evidence that the infringement was
wilfful.
2 2 3
In Gustafson, the district court did not find that the infringer's
defenses were frivolous. That fact, coupled with the fact that the
infringer had been aware of the subject patents only as of the date
on which suit was filed, led the Federal Circuit to conclude that a
finding of willfulness was precluded. Because the district court's
award of attorney fees was based solely on its finding of willful in-
fringement was determined by the Federal Circuit to be clearly er-
roneous, the attorney fee award was thus reversed. Thus, no basis
existed for designating Gustafson an "exceptional" case for granting
attorney fees.
D. Sanctions Under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
The case of Refac International Ltd. v. Hitachi, Ltd.224 in-
volved an appeal by the patentee from a district court order enter-
ing judgment of noninfringement in favor of the accused infringers
and dismissing the action pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.225
The district court had required the patentee to establish, with
219. Id. at 510-11.




224. 921 F.2d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
225. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B) allows for dismissal and default judgments as sanctions
for failing to obey a discovery order.
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particularity as to each accused infringer and each product, the ba-
sis for the alleged infringement. The patentee's response to the dis-
trict court's requirement failed to identify the elements of specific
products corresponding to the elements of the patent claims, failed
to include any analysis of the patents in suit, and was not directed
to any specific defendant or any specific accused products.
The Federal Circuit concluded that, in view of these facts, the
district court's finding of noncompliance was not clearly erroneous.
Further, the extent of the patentee's noncompliance (underscored
by the patentee's inability to spell out a proper basis for the alleged
infringements more than a year after bringing suit) supported the
district court's finding of willfulness. Thus, the Federal Circuit
found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying
Rule 37 sanctions.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirred the order of dismis-
sal, awarded attorney fees and double costs to the alleged infring-
ers,226 and remanded for consideration of appropriate sanctions
against the patentee.227
E. Calculation of Reasonable Royalty
The fact of patent infringement establishes the fact of damage
because the patent owner's right to exclude has been violated.228
However, the patent owner must still prove the amount of damage.
A patent owner who puts on little or no satisfactory evidence of a
"reasonable royalty" under 35 USC § 284 cannot successfully ap-
peal on the ground that the amount awarded by the court is not
"reasonable". 229
In the case of Lindemann Maschinenfabrik Gmbh, v. American
Hoist & Derrick Co. 230 the patent owner's sole source of evidence on
the amount of damages came from its expert, a patent attorney. At
the evidentiary hearing, the patent owner's expert gave his opinion
that a reasonable royalty rate should be based on the net selling
price of the entire machine containing the infringing components,
resulting in a damage award of between $179,844 and $244,805.
The infringer's expert gave his opinion that a reasonable royalty
226. FED. R. APP. P. 38.
227. FED. R. Cv. P. 11.
228. See Zegers v. Zegers, Inc., 458 F.2d 726, 729-30 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 878 (1972); cf Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1326
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
229. See Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1519 (Fed. Cir.
1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984).
230. 895 F.2d 1403.
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should not be based on the entire machine, and that the patent
owner's damages should total $3,000.
The district court awarded the patent owner damages of
$10,000. The patent owner appealed from the judgment, asserting
that the award was contrary to 35 USC § 284.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that when the measure of
damages is a reasonable royalty, the amount is normally provable
by the facts in evidence or as a factual inference from the evidence.
However, there is room for the district court to exercise a common-
sense estimation of what the evidence shows would be a "reason-
able" award. Therefore, to successfully challenge the district
court's finding as to the amount of damages under the "reasonable
royalty" provision of § 284, the patent owner must show that the
award is, in view of all the evidence, either so outrageously high or
so outrageously low as to be insupportable as an estimation of a
reasonable royalty.
Noting that the patent owner presented its evidence on dam-
ages solely through its single patent attorney witness, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the patent owner had failed to present evi-
dence dictating a particular amount of damages. The absence of
such evidence left the district court with the widest range of choice
for the damage award, including an award of less than $10,000.
The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment of the district
court.
F. The Requirement of an Arm's-Length Transaction for
Calculating a Reasonable Royalty
In Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Manufacturing Co.23 both a
parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary were found lia-
ble for selling an infringing product. The subsidiary sold substan-
tially all of the infringing product that it manufactured to the
parent for resale by the latter.
The district court held that the patent owner was entitled to
damages equal to a reasonable royalty for the "use" made of the
patented invention by the parent and its subsidiary. The district
court calculated the amount of the royalty based upon the price at
which the subsidiary sold the infringing product to the parent.
On appeal, the patent owner asserted that the close relation-
ship between the parent and subsidiary established that their deal-
ings with each other were not at arm's length. The patent owner
231. 898 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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challenged the district court's use of the price at which the subsidi-
ary sold the infringing product to the parent as the basis for calcu-
lating the amount of the royalty.
The Federal Circuit found that the record indicated only that
the price at which the subsidiary sold to the parent was jointly es-
tablished by the management of both companies. The record did
not establish that the parent and subsidiary set the selling price as a
result of arm's-length bargaining. In the absence of such arm's-
length bargaining, the Federal Circuit concluded that the price at
which the subsidiary sold to the parent did not provide a proper
basis for determining a reasonable royalty. Instead, the proper basis
for determining a reasonable royalty was the price at which the par-
ent sold the infringing product to its customers, since such a price
was clearly established in an arm's-length transaction. The Federal
Circuit accordingly remanded the case to the district court for rede-
termination of the reasonable royalty based upon the price at which
the parent sold the infringing product to its customers.
G. Reasonable Royalty Calculation May Not be Based
Solely on One License Agreement
The patent owner in the case of Trell v. Marlee Electronics
Corp.2" 2 did not sell the patented invention in the United States.
Consequently, the patent owner could not seek damages based on
lost profits, 233 and was required instead to present evidence of a rea-
sonable royalty.234
The evidence presented consisted of a single license agreement
which provided for a royalty rate of 6% for the exclusive right to
sell the patented invention in Europe. Based on this evidence, the
district court concluded that 6% was a reasonable royalty. The in-
fringer challenged the district court's method of calculating dam-
ages under 35 USC § 284.235
The Federal Circuit noted that, for a royalty to be established,
the royalty must be paid by a sufficient number of licensees to indi-
cate a general acquiescence in its reasonableness by those who have
occasion to use the invention. 236 The Federal Circuit found that the
232. 912 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
233. Lindemann, supra note 212, at 1406 n.2.
234. Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
235. Damages are usually calculated under § 284 by i) assessing the actual damages suf-
fered (the profits the patentee lost due to the infringement) or, ii) if actual damages cannot be




single licensing agreement in Trell, without more, was insufficient
proof of an established royalty.
Lacking evidence of an established royalty, it was necessary for
the district court to calculate a reasonable royalty based upon the
amount a willing buyer and seller would have negotiated to license
the device covered by the patent. However, the district court in
Trell had failed to determine what royalty a negotiated license
agreement between the patent owner and the infringer would have
produced. Instead, the district court based its award of damages on
the royalty paid for the single license.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court improp-
erly construed the 6% rate in the license as an established royalty
and failed to calculate a reasonable royalty. Consequently, the Fed-
eral Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the
case with instructions to determine a reasonable royalty consistent
with the methodology set forth in Fromson v. Western Litho Plate &
Supply Co.237
XV. ATTORNEY FEES - 35 USC § 285
A. Bad Faith Litigation
In Eltech Systems Corp. v. PPG Industries, Inc. 23 1 the district
court found the amended complaint asserting infringement to be
meritless, and on that basis, found the case to be exceptional pursu-
ant to 35 USC § 285 and awarded attorney fees to the accused in-
fringer.139 On appeal, the patent owner challenged the award of
attorney fees to the accused infringer, asserting that the district
court had clearly erred in finding the case exceptional on the basis
of a meritless complaint.
The Federal Circuit observed that under 35 USC § 285 the in-
terest of a patent owner in protecting its statutory rights is balanced
237. Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
238. 903 F.2d 805 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
239. Eltech Sys. Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 710 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. La. 1988). The
district court based its finding on numerous subsidiary findings: (1) the patentee's expert
performed no tests, yet concluded that there was infringement; (2) before May 1988 all tests
were done with a grade of material not used by the accused infringer; (3) the patentee did not
attempt to reproduce the accused infringer's procedures, or to evaluate products produced
according to those procedures, or to evaluate products supplied by the accused infringer, or
to evaluate any product under operating conditions; (4) the written evaluation report of the
patentee's expert was withheld as privileged and not produced during discovery nor offered
into evidence at trial, supporting an inference that it was not favorable to the patentee; and
(5) the patentee's attempt to excuse its conduct on the basis that it was acting on oral advice
of counsel while revealing no technical or legal basis for such advice, was inadequate. Id. at
637-38.
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by the interest of the public in confining such rights to their legal
limits.2" With respect to bad faith litigation, there is no difference
in the standards applicable to patent owners and to accused infring-
ers. Each is required to prove the other guilty of bad faith by clear
and convincing evidence in light of the totality of the circumstances.
The balance is not tipped in favor of either side.
The Federal Circuit found in Eltech that the patent owner had
been manifestly unreasonable in assessing infringement, while con-
tinuing to assert infringement in court. An inference of bad faith
was therefore proper, regardless of whether that inference of bad
faith was grounded in, or denominated as, wrongful intent, reckless-
ness, or gross negligence. The Federal Circuit consequently af-
firmed the district court's judgment and award, and awarded to the
accused infringer its attorney fees and double the costs it incurred in
connection with the appeal.
XVI. JURISDICTION AND REVIEW
A. Venue Under 28 USC § 1400(b) With Respect to
Corporate Defendants
The bases for establishing venue in patent infringement actions
is set forth in 28 USC § 1400(b):
(b) Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in
the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the de-
fendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular
and established place of business.
The Supreme Court in the case of Fourco Glass Co. v. Trans-
mirra Products Corp.2 ' confirmed that for defendants corpora-
tions, the term "resides", as used in § 1400(b), meant the state of
incorporation only. The Supreme Court's decision in Fourco is gen-
erally viewed as holding § 1400(b) as the exclusive venue statute in
patent infringement actions, and that the meaning of the terms in
§ 1400(b) are not to be altered or supplemented by other provisions
found in the general venue statutes. Section 1391(c), the general
venue section that addresses the question of where corporations
may be sued and contains language about the residence of corpora-
tions, therefore, did not supplement the specific provisions of
§ 1400(b).
At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Fourco,
§ 1391(c) consisted of one sentence:
240. Machinery Corp. v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 471 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
241. 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
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(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it
is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business,
and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of
such corporation for venue purposes.
The first clause of § 1391(c) (up to the comma) established venue
for corporations.
In 1988 Congress amended § 1391(c) and adopted a new defi-
nition of "reside" as it applies to venue for corporate defendants.
The former one-sentence subsection of § 1391(c) now consists of
two sentences. The new first sentence of amended § 1391(c) reads:
(c) For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is
a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in
which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action
is commenced. 242
In the case of VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance
Co. 243 the Federal Circuit was presented with the issue of whether,
by amendment to § 139 1(c), Congress meant to apply that new defi-
nition to the term "reside" as it is used in § 1400(b), and thus
change the long-standing interpretation of the patent venue statute.
The patent owner in VEfHoldings had filed suit in U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California. The accused in-
fringer moved to dismiss for improper venue. The district court
found that the accused infringer, as an Iowa corporation, did not
"reside" in California, as that term has been construed in § 1400(b),
and, in addition, that the accused infringer did not have a regular
and established place of business in the Northern District of Cali-
fornia. The District Court therefore held that venue did not lie in
the Northern District of California with respect to the accused
infringer.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found the language of the
amended statute was clear and its meaning was unambiguous. On
its face, amended § 1391(c) clearly applies to § 1400(b), and thus
redefines the meaning of the term "resides" in § 1400(b). The Fed-
eral Circuit found no legislative intent, let alone clearly expressed
intent, contrary to the plain meaning of the first sentence of the
amended statute.
The Federal Circuit held that Congress, by its 1988 amend-
ment of 28 USC § 1391(c), had changed the meaning of the term
242. The phrase "this chapter" refers to chapter 87 of title 28, which encompasses
§§ 1391-1412, and thus includes § 1400(b).
243. 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991).
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"resides" in § 1400(b). Thus, the first test for venue under
§ 1400(b) with respect to a defendant that is a corporation, in light
of the 1988 amendment to § 1391(c), is whether the defendant was
subject to personal jurisdiction in the district of suit at the time the
action was commenced. Under amended § 1391(c), venue is proper
in a patent infringement case in any district where there would be
personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant at the time the
action is commenced. This test is narrower than allowing venue
wherever a corporate defendant could be served, but is broader than
that encompassed by the previous standard of "place of
incorporation."
Since the accused infringer had conceded personal jurisdiction
over it in the Northern District of California, the accused infringer
"resides" in that district, within the meaning of the first test of
§ 1400(b), and venue properly lies in the Northern District of Cali-
fornia. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment of
the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
B. Federal Circuit Jurisdiction Over Patent Counterclaims
In Christianson v. Colt,2' the U.S. Supreme Court concluded
that the mere presence of patent law issues did not mean the Fed-
eral Circuit had jurisdiction to hear an appeal.24 The Supreme
Court in Christianson dealt with the effect on Federal Circuit juris-
diction of patent law issues raised only as a defense. No patent
claims appeared in the complaint or in any counterclaim.
The issue presented in Aerojet-General Corporation v. Machine
Tool Works 2" was whether, in light of Christianson, the Federal
Circuit had jurisdiction to hear an appeal in which the district
court's jurisdiction over the complaint was not based on 28 USC
§ 1338. However, there was a counterclaim over which the district
court would have had § 1338 jurisdiction if the counterclaim had
been a complaint.
The plaintiff in Aerojet-General sued the defendant for unfair
competition, interference with prospective economic advantage,
false representation, and declaratory judgment that trade secrets
244. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
245. The court pointed out that under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), jurisdiction is granted to
the Federal Circuit over "an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the U.S.... if
the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on [28 U.S.C. § ]1338." Under
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), jurisdiction is granted to district courts "of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents." This judgment vacated the Federal Circuit's deci-
sion in Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1552-53 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
246. 895 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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were not misappropriated. Federal subject matter jurisdiction was
predicated upon the presence of a federal question247 and diversity
of citizenship.24
The defendant answered and counterclaimed for breach of con-
tract, unfair competition, trade secret misappropriation, false repre-
sentation, and patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271. The
defendant's counterclaims were compulsory.249 There was no sug-
gestion in the record that the defendant's counterclaim for patent
infringement was insubstantial, frivolous, or asserted for the pur-
pose of manipulating the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.
The district court issued an order staying proceedings and or-
dering arbitration of all claims, including the defendant's counter-
claim for patent infringement. The plaintiff appealed to the Federal
Circuit, saying it did so under 28 USC §§ 1291 and 1295, or alter-
natively 28 USC § 1292 (1982).
Considering the jurisdictional question en banc, the Federal
Circuit reasoned that if the compulsory counterclaim for patent in-
fringement had been filed as a complaint, then it would have clearly
stated a separate cause of action "arising under" the patent statutes
and would, therefore, have invoked the district court's jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. Consequently, it would have also invoked
the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
The Federal Circuit found it incongruous to hold that it had appel-
late jurisdiction when a well-pleaded patent infringement claim was
the basis of a pleading labeled "complaint," but not when the identi-
cal well-pleaded claim was the basis of a pleading labeled "counter-
claim." Moreover, the intent of Congress in creating the Federal
Circuit would be frustrated by focusing exclusively on the com-
plaint, and directing appeals involving compulsory counterclaims
for patent infringement to the twelve regional circuits.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit held in Aerojet-General that
it did have appellate subject matter jurisdiction; the compulsory
counterclaim for patent infringement was a separate, nonfrivolous
claim, having its own § 1338 jurisdictional basis independent of the
jurisdictional basis of the complaint.
The Federal Circuit expressly limited its holding in Aerojet-
General to cases in which a nonfrivolous compulsory counterclaim
for patent infringement is filed in an action originally and properly
brought in a federal district court. The Federal Circuit expressly
247. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
248. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
249. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
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left open the question of whether the holding would be the same in
the case of a permissive counterclaim for patent infringement.
C. Discovery Directed to Non-Parties Must Meet Relevancy
Requirement
The case of Micro Motion, Inc. v. Kane Steel Co., Inc.25 in-
volved an order of a district court in an ancillary proceeding to ob-
tain discovery from a nonparty in connection with a patent
infringement suit being tried before a different district court.
The patent owner had sued the accused infringer in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California. After suit
was filed, the patent owner sought a subpoena for deposition and
production of documents from the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey. The subpoena was directed to a nonparty com-
pany which competed with both the patent owner and the accused
infringer. The patent owner sought to obtain information25' that
was purportedly relevant to the issue of damages in the California
patent infringement suit.
The nonparty filed a motion to quash, or in the alternative, to
modify the scope of the requested disclosure. The nonparty argued
that the information sought by the patent owner was not relevant;
that its confidentiality was essential to the nonparty; and that its
disclosure would cause the nonparty serious if not irreparable in-
jury, even if disclosure occurred under a protective order.
The patent owner responded that a protective order was suffi-
cient to protect the nonparty's interests, and that the requested in-
formation was relevant to the issue of damages. In order for the
patent owner to recover lost profits, it needed to prove that the non-
party's products either infringed the patents in suit or were unac-
ceptable noninfringing substitutes.
The New Jersey district court denied the nonparty's motion to
quash the subpoena, except with respect to disclosure of the identi-
ties of the nonparty's customers.
As an initial matter on appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected the
argument that the nonparty's objections were obviated by the entry
of a protective order. The Federal Circuit stated that a protective
order neither eliminates the requirement of relevance nor substi-
tutes for establishing relevance.
250. 894 F.2d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
251. The information sought included confidential business information of the nonparty
such as product sales volume and customer lists.
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The Federal Circuit then stated that the patent owner's asser-
tion of a claim for lost profit damages did not, in and of itself, estab-
lish relevance with respect to all of the information sought from the
nonparty competitor. The court reasoned that if a patent owner
was entitled to discovery of information concerning each competi-
tor's business merely because it might seek to prove lost profit dam-
ages, then a patent owner could, in virtually every infringement
suit, immediately obtain discovery from all possible competitors by
merely filing a complaint asking for damages against one. The con-
sequences of such a policy would clearly lead to abuse of the discov-
ery process.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the patent owner had
failed to establish any right under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to the requested discovery. Consequently, the Federal Circuit
found that nonparty's motion to quash should have been granted in
its entirety.
D. Stay of District Court Judgment Pending Appeal
In the case of Standard Havens Products, Inc. v. Gencor Indus-
tries, Inc.,2" 2 the accused infringer moved to stay execution of the
judgment and imposition of an injunction entered by the district
court during the pendency of an appeal to the Federal Circuit.
In deciding the issue, the Federal Circuit identified four factors
guiding its discretion to issue a stay pending appeal: (1) whether a
strong showing has been made that the stay applicant is likely to
succeed on the merits; (2) whether the stay applicant will be irrepa-
rably injured in the absence of a stay; (3) whether issuance of the
stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the pro-
ceeding; and (4) whether the public interest is served by granting or
denying the stay.253
In Standard Havens the Federal Circuit found that the in-
fringer had shown that the existence of a substantial legal question
existed regarding the validity of the patent, and that the infringer
had a substantial chance of prevailing on appeal.1 4 The Federal
Circuit also found that the balance of harms tipped clearly in the
infringer's favor. The patent owner's harm was speculative and did
252. 897 F.2d 511 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
253. See Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
v. Phillips Petroleum, 835 F.2d 277, 278 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
254. The infringer pointed out that after the jury verdict, but before entry of judgment,
the Commissoner of Patents and Trademarks, sua sponte, ordered reexamination of the in-
fringed patent because the Commissioner had found that a pertinent prior art reference raised
a substantial new question of patentability.
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not threaten its viability. On the other hand, substantial evidence
indicated that the harm reasonably expected by the infringer would
be both catastrophic and irreparable. Without a stay, the infringer
might cease to exist. The Federal Circuit therefore granted the in-
fringer's motion for a stay pending appeal.
E. The Requirement of Controversy in a Declaratory
Judgment Suit Brought by a Patent Owner Against an
Alleged Future Infringer
Declaratory judgment actions are most commonly brought
against a patent owner by an accused infringer seeking a declaration
of noninfringement or invalidity, or both. Declaratory judgment
actions are less frequently brought by a patent owner against a
party who will allegedly infringe in the future.255
Regardless of whether the declaratory judgment action is
brought by the patent owner or the accused infringer, the sole re-
quirement for jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, is
that the conflict between the parties must be real and immediate.
There must be a true, actual "controversy. 256
The issue of whether a patent owner met the actual contro-
versy requirement necessary to maintain a cause of action under the
Declaratory Judgment Act was presented in the case of Lang v. Pa-
cific Marine and Supply Co.257
The subject patents in Lang were directed to certain features of
a ship's hull. The patent owner sued the accused infringer in April,
1988, seeking a declaratory judgment that the accused infringer's
acts constituted patent infringement and/or threatened infringe-
ment. At the time suit was filed, the accused infringer was in the
process of manufacturing a hull structure that the patent owner
contended would, when finished, infringe its patents. The vessel
was not scheduled for completion until February, 1989.
The district court granted the accused infringer's motion to
dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or
failure to state a claim under rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal
255. For examples of actions brought by patent owners fearing future infringement, see
Erbamont Inc. v. Cetus Corp., 720 F. Supp. 387 (D. Del. Aug. 23, 1989); Westnofa USA Inc.
v. British Design (U.S.A.) Corp., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Automation Sys.,
Inc. v. Intel Corp., 501 F. Supp. 345 (S.D. Iowa 1980); Proler Steel Corp. v. Luria Bros. &
Co., 223 F. Supp. 87 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
256. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
257. 895 F.2d 761 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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Rules of Civil Procedure.2" 8 The patentee appealed the district
court's order dismissing the complaint.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit identified two elements that
must be present in order to meet the controversy requirement in a
declaratory judgment suit brought by a patent owner against an al-
leged future infringer. First, the alleged future infringer must be
engaged in, or be making meaningful preparation for, an activity
directed toward making, using or selling that would subject it to an
infringement charge under 35 USC § 271(a). Second, the acts of the
alleged future infringer must indicate a refusal to change the course
of its actions in the face of acts by the patent owner sufficient to
create a reasonable apprehension that a suit will be forthcoming.
In Lang, the Federal Circuit determined that the patent owner
had failed to meet the actual controversy requirement necessary to
maintain a cause of action under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
The accused infringing ship's hull was not scheduled to be finished
until at least nine months after the complaint had been filed. The
accused infringer had not distributed sales literature, prepared to
solicit orders, or engaged in any activity indicating that the ship
would soon be ready for sea. The Federal Circuit therefore con-
cluded that there was no substantial controversy of sufficient imme-
diacy and reality to warrant consideration of the patent owner's
claim for declaratory relief, and affirmed the district court's dismis-
sal of the complaint.
F. Time of Filing an Appeal
On June 5, 1989, after a successful jury trial, the plaintiff in
Jurgens v. Timothy2 9 moved for attorney fees and prejudgment in-
terest. In an order dated July 5, 1989, the district court resolved
substantially all post-trial motions, but expressly deferred a decision
on plaintiff's request for attorney fees and prejudgment interest un-
til further briefing could be had. Judgment was entered the same
day.
Within 30 days of the district court's entry of judgment, the
defendant filed a notice of appeal. Within 14 days of the defen-
dandant/appellant's appeal, the plaintiff filed its notice of cross-ap-
peal. After the notice of cross-appeal had been filed, the district
court granted plaintiff/appellee's pending motion for prejudgment
interest.
258. Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 703 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Haw. 1989).
259. 905 F.2d 382 (Fed. Cir. 1990), disapproved on other grounds, Smith v. Barry, 112 S.
Ct. 678 (1992).
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The appellant moved to dismiss the cross-appeal, on the
ground that the notice of cross-appeal was of no effect because it
had been filed prior to the district court's disposition of the motion
for prejudgment interest. The appellant asserted that the appellee's
June 5, 1989 motion requesting prejudgment interest had been a
timely motion under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to amend the July 5, 1989 judgment. Therefore, according to
the appellant, the appellee's notice of cross-appeal filed prior to the
disposition of that motion was premature.
The issue on appeal was whether a motion for prejudgment
interest, filed before the formal entry of judgment, constitutes a
Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, and thus, ren-
dering ineffective any notice of appeal filed before the disposition of
that motion.
Rule 59(e) states that "[a] motion to alter or amend the judg-
ment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judg-
ment." The Federal Circuit noted, however, that the language of
Rule 59(e) does not expressly require that there be a pre-existing
judgment. It only requires that the motion be served "not later
than 10 days after entry of judgment." A condition that was clearly
met in Jurgens. The Federal Circuit, therefore, concluded that the
10-day limit in Rule 59 sets only a maximum period, but does not
nullify an otherwise valid motion made before a formal judgment
has been entered. The Federal Circuit consequently granted the ap-
pellant's motion and dismissed the cross-appeal.
G. Interlocutory Decisions Appealable Under 28 USC
§ 1292(c)(2)
Under 28 USC § 1295(a)(1) the Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction of an appeal from a "final decision" of a district court
whose jurisdiction, in whole or in part, arises under an Act of Con-
gress relating to patents. In addition, the Federal Circuit has exclu-
sive jurisdiction to review certain "interlocutory decisions" in such
cases, as provided by 28 USC § 1292(c).2 °
The case of Johannsen v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest,
Inc. 261 involved an appeal from a judgment of the district court in a
case involving both design patent infringement and unfair competi-
260. 28 USC § 1292(c) (1982) states: "The United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction... (2) of an appeal from a judgment in a civil
action for patent infringement which would otherwise be appealable to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and is final except for an accounting."
261. 918 F.2d 160 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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tion. The judgment entered by the district court concluded all lia-
bility issues between the parties, but stayed proceedings on
injunctive relief and an accounting for unfair competition damages.
The parties appealed, asserting that the judgment was an interlocu-
tory decision appealable under 28 USC § 1292(c)(2).
The issue before the Federal Circuit was whether a district
court judgment that pronounces liability for unfair competition and
orders an accounting - but pronounces no infringement of patent
rights and orders no patent accounting - is appealable under
§ 1292(c)(2).
The Federal Circuit noted that if the patent infringement claim
had been the only claim asserted, then the judgment of no infringe-
ment would not be an appealable interlocutory decision under
§ 1292(c)(2). The Federal Circuit found no reason why the intro-
duction of non-patent claims should trigger § 1292(c)(2) and
change the basic interplay between § 1292(c)(2) and § 1295.
The Federal Circuit, therefore, held that 28 USC § 1292(c)(2)
does not permit appeal from a judgment on mixed patent and unfair
competition claims that denies all patent infringement claims and
adjudges liability only for unfair competition as to which a decision
on damages and injunctive relief is yet to be made. The appeal was
therefore dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
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